

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Problems of WBR

S1,191

WBIR is about
THE RE-AMALGAMATION OF ~~A~~ WHOLE THING
WHICH ~~AT~~ PREVIOUS TECHNOLOGICAL ~~TIMES~~ STAGES ~~HAD~~
BEEN A NUMBER OF DIFFERENT THINGS.

SL, 187 ~~1887~~

WBIR

Assuming ~~the~~ money & attention
(& the minimum of technological
development.)

#00421

S1,194

~~GF/TRNBK~~ WBIR

FANTRAN is a

Generalized Cataloguer,

Contingency Analyzer and

Information Pool.

#00417

SL,196

WBIR - NORX

Dft modalities of cash register
in supermarket right now

#00420

S1,190

WBIR

Sliced sound + backtracker
→ Speedup in listening.

#00427

WBIR

TV BUFFERS to hold
images from all libraries.

#00428

SL, 186

WBIR

DISPLAY SYSTEMS, LEAD-INS FOR ENTICEMENT

TAG & ASSOCIATION SYSTEMS
that mark things a given person will want to see

ORGANIZING & MNEMONIC SYSTEMS

#00426

51,189

WB IR

Authorized 'main strain'
such that you can say
properly, "Yes I read it."

#00427

S1, 198

WBIR

The / My big general IR program has:

COUNTER & TRACER ~~of~~ WHO USES IT

MARGINALIA INPUTTER
(equiv. to writing in margins)

INPUTTER & OUTPUTTER (possible needing authentication of the re-programmer.)
(the generalized form.) ~~For any material, innocent or not.~~

ALTERNATE VERSIONS ~~for~~ (innocent, e.g. differently graded or malignant secret to some)

INDICATORS of whether there's material connected to a thing at a point in a mode. These could be optional or not.

#00121

SL, 200

WBIR

...renders The establishment of low-cost, permanent archives easy.

#00410

SL, 197

WBIR

We may drown in a glut of trivial historical detail, perhaps of interest to some analyst at some time in the indefinite future.

#00420

SI, 199

WBIR

Compare the browsing bookstore and the ask-for-it library.

#00420

S1, 193

WBIR

Scoundrels, wags & just inventive-minded programmers & department heads can introduce tricks and quirks into systems which will have consequences.

#00427

#00427

S1,192

WBIR

The proliferation & diffusion of repositories, esp. tape & film.

The ~~prol~~ proliferation of dissident reports & opinions.

The easier-&-easier FORGEABILITY — immediately & gratuitously possible ~~[illegible]~~ of such things.

#00427

#00427

SL, 195

WBIR

Validational mechanisms.

New cash registers flash "clear" as you start through grocery line. But then we gotta trust the men who wired them.

WITH STORED - PROGRAM VERSATILITY, IT'S EVEN WORSE.

#00421

S1, 188

WBIR INSTITUTIONAL SETTING !

Checks & balances, perquisites & (forbiddings) of university, library & organization affiliation may be severely jolted. !

Org's may give you whole new accesses; private orgs. peddling this may be set up. Secret informations (e.g. medical) may come nearer to access to all.

#00427

S1,185

NBIR

DIVISIONS OF SECURITY CLASSIFICATIONS

(having no time to check particular things that go out under those heads.)

#00425

S1, 184

WBIR
EDITORSHIP &
New compilations of historiography, bibliography may well take on a newly personal (or pseudo-personal, corporately personal) touch.

#00427

WBIR

The Encyclopedia will come to an end soon.

#00427

S1,65

OUTLINE OF DAM SUPER DAM 2

QUESTIONS OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF GRATIFICATION-PATTERNS, MOTIVATION, etc., IN SOCIETY.

No. This should be saved for a later section.

S1, 153

CDHS / ~~skx~~ ~~[illegible]~~ continued interest, and "taking a person for granted," etc.

PSYCHOLOGICAL PRINCIPLE:

If ~~[illegible]~~ a person keeps thinking about a thing and having to calculate about whether it will do what he wants, he will be more attentive to it, more interested in it, and more pleased when it fulfills his wants.

~~(Like any complicated statement) this may be wrong in many places. Whether it is generally wrong or right is hence very complicated [illegible] analyzing first its senses, then summating them~~

N.B. Not just disjunction of fragments but other →

#00408

S1,145

CDHS

There is no reason to suppose that lobsters — or at any rate, cattle — do not feel quite as much pain as we.

Hence we must find plausible principals ~~which~~ discriminate between their pain and which let us go about our daily lives, and the human.

#00385

S1, 143

NØRX

Removal of Dostoievskian moods from the world —— how measure the good?

How know the result?

How gather this (more vapid, more secure) state to the bosom?

#00422

51, 156

The language of blame is system-bound.

Under new systems the blame-points might fall differently,
and there would be less of them.

~~A blame-syste~~

84,82

FRONTIERS & EXTREME POSSIBILITIES

TMC ENUMERATION OF THE C'STANCES

WE CANNOT EVALUATE ~~UNDER WHICH~~ OUR WHOLE (human caring)

SOCIETAL BASIS IS JEOPARDIZED

—— That is, likely to change to something which is very different — though I cannot prove it wrong, I cannot endorse this new condition.

IMPLANTED ELECTRODES & other ultra-private schemes of caring.

PENDING DESTRUCTION OF THE UNIVERSE

#00422

S1,125

~~ISX~~ INTERNAL BARGAINING.

NORX
~~SRC/CDHS~~ ~~DECISION CENTERS~~

The man with several woends & just so much ointment.

Both ~~PAIN~~ & KNOWLEDGE will figure in his weighting.

TIME adds more complications. Will he get more? Shoot himself if none comes?

#00386

S1,122

TMC

It is perhaps curious that all our acts and enterprises should be based on things so nebulous and seemingly insubstantial as the soul's needs —— unity, rest, replies to galling questions and satisfactions that contribute to a sense of well-being...

#00417

® SRC

S1,126

POLITICAL WHOLE-THINGNESS.

~~NOR~~ TMC

Enforcing political separateness of two endeavors...

¶ In ~~Laos~~ Korea, Laos, & now Bizerte, Diebienphu
it is a standard limited-war tactic now to juggle or defer recognizing the legitimacy of intnl. agencies till there has been some kind of military breakthrough, ...

¶ RED CROSS has by various means stayed a-polit.cal.

#00418

51,63

OUTLINE OF SRC

THE WHOLE OF COMMUNICATION AND CONTROL, ONE AND INSEPARABLE.

Control over ~~your~~ another's interpretation of ~~another's~~ your actions

FOISTING NEW DISTINCTIONS ~~of~~ in interp. of you

FOISTING ~~BLURRED~~ NEWLY BLURRED UNDERSTANDING ON YOU

MANEUVERING ON A FIELD OF DISJUNCTIVE INTERPRETAPLIX

CONTROL OVER ANOTHER'S ACTIONS

Schelling.

S1, 86

SRC ALSO

1 CONVERGENCE

2 Situation structure as building on a few elements, which freeze, but repolarizing

3 MARGINAL INTERESTS etc. (possible gains)

4 FOT & pleasure (e.g. for coquetry)

SRC

#00424

SRC Desideratum also:

APPARENT COHERENCE.

Also, Alibis & 'covers' for seeking information, etc.

#00424

S1, 87

SRC also

#00424

MANEUVERING OF
YOUR APPARENT
DISTRACTION &
ATTENTION.

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TMC: used & gleaned

S1,123

TMC terminology

DYNAMIC CENTER

- Communication
- Consideration
- Bargaining
- Locomotion
- Decision

... in some significant combination.

#00418

A, 2

S1, 21

TMC

My main criticism
is the world's assumption
of locked organization
& anchored concepts.

#00420

A

TMC

ANOTHER MAIN COMPLAINT OF MINE:

THE ASSUMPTION OF
'ULTIMACY'

2. That values are 'ultimate, not ploughing back into the cognitive or reorganizing under examination, w/t time &c.
1. That some concepts need no examination, reorientation, context-evaluation...

#00420

This may be because they are 'anchored' seeming to have an immutable clarity and permanence, or because they are unexaminable for some reason. The following terms are often used to avoid this examination: 'mystery' (sacred,) self-evident truth, matter of opinion, basic value.

TMC : Old Source Stuff

S-O, ~~129~~ 130

~~THE~~ CROSS-PREDICATION COMPLEX.

I. THE GAME OF SEEKING TRUTH.

Cross-predication simple: definition. ← 'Approximations' to be lightly treated here.

II. ESSENCES & TRUEST FORMS.

Stages, principal parts... as taking significance from their relation to other stuff.

Significance, relevance, clarity or importance of a predication.

III. LITTLE PATTERN AND BIG SYSTEM.

Componential analysis of things. Families of resemblances.
The notion of a whittled-down generality, rather than spun-up.
∴ Idea that a false generality may be merely a misstated one.
How comparisons, descriptions, measurings, may be in many ways applicable & reasonable.
(Reinforcement of truth-seeking business; flexible denominations the better. Otherwise you MISS damnit.

IV. NEW RING TO MORAL QUESTION

~~these problems~~ (cross-predicaton not significant here.)

CROSS-PREDICATION: SECTIONED

5. Let me use the term "predicate," as it is traditionally used, for a term, idea or whatnot which is assigned to a kind of thing. Thus the predication "red" is ordinarily assigned to objects reflecting light of roughly such-and-such wavelengths, the predicate "soft" is assigned to things which yield under pressure in certain ways.

But there are other predicates which seem less well tied down, and it is of these we tend to say, "it depends on your definition," because the predicate, "democratic," say, can be applied variously depending on what kinds of thing are taken to be 'democratic.'

This other set of meanings may be thought

STOP

S-O, 132 ~~131~~

II

CONJUNCT PREDICATION

~~DESCRIPTIONS~~ OF A THING: WHETHER THEY ARE TO BE TOUCHED IN CERTAIN WAYS.

A IT DEPENDS ON YOUR DEFINITION

B BUT WORDS REALLY HAVE MEANING, & DEFS. NOT ARBITRARY

C USE OF EXAMPLES TO CLARIFY

D DISJUNCTIONS TO CLARIFY. VAGUENESS, MIXED TRUTH-VALUE.
NOT GOD or GOOD but TRUE, CAUSE, OBJECT.

PROPONENT & OPPONENT:

SAVING INSIGHT by SHIFTING MEANING of ~~PREDICATES~~

ATTACKING — A) 'IT DEPENDS ON YOUR DEFINITION, AND THAT'S ALL.'

KEEP SAVING IT — THAT ISN'T WHAT I MEANT AT ALL, AT ALL

ATTACKING — B) YOU'RE JUMPING AROUND

DO YOU WANT TO REFUTE ME, OR SOME IMPOSTER-THEORY

ATTACKING — C) YOUR THEORY IS MEANINGLESS PIFFLE — IT'S INDETERMINATE AS REGARDS YOUR LOGIC, THAT'S ALL; NO DEDUCTIVE STRUX NONTRIVIAL. NO MIN. REQ.'S FOR MEANING!

SYNTHESIS: INSIGHT IS: "~~AHA~~-THERE-IS-A-PREDICATE-SUCH-THAT..."

PREDICATES

COMPLEX ANALYZABLE ~~GOOD, TRUE~~ ↓ III

& THE THINGS THAT ARE

S-O, ~~132~~ ~~133~~ 133

II

IS BLACK THE LACK OF WHITE?

YOU AREN'T TREATING ME AS AN INDIVIDUAL
HE'S TRYING TOO HARD

UNITED STATES IS NOT A DEMOCRACY → What it is: See ~~II~~ or IV

ARE WE ALL MURDERERS?
AM I MY BROTHER'S KEEPER?
GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE...

WAR IS COLLECTIVE INSANITY
BEING VERY EMOTIONAL
" OVERSTIMULATED
HAVING FREE WILL

WHOLE-PART DISTINCTION
HOW MANY THINGS DO YOU DO IN THERE?
WHERE IS CULTURE?
IS THERE A SANTA CLAUS?
DO PEOPLE CONFORM FROM FEAR?
" " LEAD LIVES OF QUIET DESPERATION?
DRUNKEN EMPTY OR FULL STOMACH?

TRUE IN A SENSE vs. TRUE IN SOME CASES
GIVE EXAMPLES BUT DON'T DEFINE

DISJUNCTION OF PROBLEM
Weak (mixed, vague) — could mean either...
Strong — ~~and & does~~ means all These, all true...

We're left to evidence: finding out what world is like.
ON TO MATTER OF DESCRIBING WORLD, OR, WHAT IT IS.

S-0,134

Sk x. - nor x.

TITLES out of notes. & terms

MORALS FOR YOU.

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PEOPLE
(How should we act on them - e.g. race?)

DIVISION INTO
ADMINISTRATIVE CATEGORIES

lump together
ART, SOCIETY & POSSIBILITY
(how different aspects of art change w. time)

Large questions and small research.

"Except sometimes" ((big sociology-truth))

The ~~Xxxxx~~ Context of Concepts

Little Pattern and Big System

S-0,135

'EMPIRICAL ESSENCE'--

1. Straightening out of concept (through empirical research,) not of the ordinary-language term i.e. changing its theoretical content. NOT changing the ordinary-language term, except perhaps as this may come about later.

   THEREFORE there is no disproving of old usage, though there is dismissal of old sense.

2. Even as regards the new theoretical concept, however, because of the open weave of science there cannot be definition (scriven point.) (Not to mention possibility that we may never be able to predict terribly well.)

3. Suppose a map is published which we agree to follow, placing East Blintz the dividing line between East Blintz and West Blintz on Cheese Street, while we had previously thought the boundary was on Jelly Street. It does not make our previous talk incorrect.

4. It is a further theory that a certain kind of variable, thing, etc., may have so many different kinds and etc. that there may be no sharp predications to it. Rather, there will be many overlaps, and no boundaries common enough to be given overriding significance.



S-O, 136

POINTS TO GET THE HELL IN.

Distinction between 'approx. true' & 'precisely true in several ways' & 'true with precise alternatives.'

THEY MAY LOOK ALIKE.

~~WHADDIA MEAN ON THIS THING?~~

How do I work in the 'PATRIARCHAL FORMULATION' NONSENSE?

A) WE MAY REGARD A ~~STATEMENT~~ GENERAL STT. AS ~~A DISTILLATION~~ A SUMMARY OF THOSE WHICH HOLD (ALL THE BOYS LOVE DOLLY)

B) 1) JOHN IS ON THE RIGHT OF ALF (SAME FOR 8 GUYS) → THEY ARE IN A CIRCLE

2) JOHN IS NORTH 3) THEY ARE AT SUCH-&-SUCH ANGLES.

→ ALL FACTS.

THIS LEAVES OUT A LOT; BUT WITH SIMPLE ALGEBRA, OR SENSE IF YOU FEAR M*TH, YOU KNOW PRETTY NEAR EVERYTHING ABOUT THE SYSTEM

PREVIOUS INSIGHTS e.g., "A, B, C & D were in a circle", ~~there was a man between Alf & Wolfgang~~ have been shown true. Others, like "George was three seats from Alf," have been shown true in one sense (clockwise,) false in another (counterclockwise.) In this way, all previous insights have been checked out."

BUT in Sociology or bigger cognitive fields it is rarely that easy, for the number of ways things might be true is rarely that small, & rarely fits so easily into a small field.

NOTATION THEORY.

NOTATION SHOULD SHOW AS MUCH AS YOU WANT TO PUT DOWN, BUT NO POINT IN MUCH MORE.

NOTATING DRUMBEATS becomes for sophist. drummer virtually impossible in some ways; new notations must be devised...

WHAT I AM SAYING applies to 'ideal types,' and 'patterns' & 'archetypes' & scales & dichotomies & continua & subcultures & dynamic entities & stages & ~~~~~~. Other kinds of more straightforward stuff it also covers, but not interesting to so fuck that.

S-O, 137

HARD TO GET PAST WORDS.
Confronted by description, what means? E.g. 'man is basically an animal'. This is nothing to agree with or disagree with if we understand.

⇒ PREDIC. STRENGTH.

S-O, 138

II

EXAMPLES make clear an INSIGHT

as well as general thing ('cause', 'truth'...)

5-0, 139

I happen to think that all questions can be answered, or if not exactly answered, understood to the point that we no longer act them the same way. ~~(Like~~

3 THINGS THAT (MAKE LOGIC VERY DIFFICULT)

[& are tough pts. in modern philos.]

TRUTH — there are many sft. of which we can say, 'that's true' — and be very frustrated because knowing a lot of things that are true, and naming things that aren't, CAUSE don't help us say what it is.

EASY To name cases of causation — and list its kinds. But we can't state nec & suff. conditions: that cause shd. be always followed by effect, or be touched by it in known way.

GOOD — Here we think we know a lot of things that are good — but — seems a PZnbl. Thing To ask, qua philosopher, is anything really?

S-O, 140

BUT

It is not as though we cannot use these ideas without defining them.

WE DO KNOW WHAT ~~THEY~~ MEAN to a certain extent—

True — not be disconfirmed by proper evidence

cause — not happen w/o effect

good — certain shouldness about seeking it.

IN SAME WAY AND MORE FULLY, the ~~other~~ predicates of interest can be analyzed..

To investigation of what things are like, and seek causelike patterns therein

To investigate the quality of shouldness

S-0,141

VI
(1)

A. APPROXIMATIONS of ACTION.

The results of any possible "schematic" — set of directions to follow, order of procedure, category in a given field of action... can be measured or predicted. The accuracy varies (but so what?) The point is that this can be done — whether for any means of operating, or controlling a lot of little decisions interrelatedly, or for any larger scheme for pre-conditioning or ignoring these decisions.

B. THE MEASUREMENT partakes of 'comparing schematics' as does any measurement, I suppose.

C. Can be measured according to any criteria that may be desired: on any time-basis, on any payoff function (caution, etc.) And these in turn, with successively widening approximacies, may be measured by other criteria.

S:0, 142

VI
(2)

A. Result orientation: nothing may not be omitted from consideration...

D. We look for a place to stop.
How is this one?
There are many many sets of rules & procedure adequate to human life.
Producing motivation, joy, sorrow...

E. The limitations born of soul. We cannot directly measure these things, but have to select some and establish a commitment to them.

F. So which to select? Luckily none need be selected for the society, though we may wish to urge some upon it. But for ourselves... here no help either: can point up necessity of choice, or the no-choice alternative that does not prevent people from being kind & moral, though it doesn't command respect.

G. Plural-valued society... curious further paradoxes.

S-0, 143

VI
insert

3)

4) SO ALL THESE ARE IN SOME SENSE CALCULABLE, BUT CLEARLY REMOVED FROM US IN ANY BUT A GUESS SENSE.

6) THE SEARCH FOR A CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE BECOMES: WHICH OF THESE IS GENERAL & DEMANDING ENOUGH?

OR THE STOCHASTIC CAT. IMPERATIVE ...
WHICH IS BEST GUESS FOR PAYOFF SCHEDULE ETC. WHICH I THINK IS SUSTENABLE?

0,1

6 outlines in 7 pages
2-3 September 60.

TRUTH, MAN AND CHOICE. Outline 1

"Schematics," etc., had roughly the following outline, and I'm tempted to try to follow it again. (It was also roughly the outline for ~~the~~ "A-P," the Armageddon-Paper.)

Explanation of the nature of patterns and descriptions
Application to things (and society)
Application to action and choice and administration.

#1

However, I am no longer sure I have such general things to say about the nature of patterns, but I do have a lot to say about how they fit together, so maybe such a section ~~[illegible]~~ will be justified after all.

(Incidentally, one of the sad points about ~~[illegible]~~ all this effort is the duplication of work, now and past. For instance, ~~[illegible]~~ I believe I used the terms 'interlock,' ~~[illegible]~~ 'intersection premises,' and 'cross-predication' for roughly the same things.)

Another outline that makes sense to me, however, goes like this: (Just a list of points, not necessarily order.)

#2

I. List of questions and puzzles
Analysis
Traps and confusions that may kill your insight: defs. etc.
When should you try to save an insight?
Clarity, co-predication, ~~[illegible]~~
Components of ~~[illegible]~~ theories and things that move together. Cluster-terms. Clusters that move on fields.
Problems of relating single idea and system of ideas. (This is saving the insight again.)
Relation of this to some of the important variables of sociology. AND ordinary language.

II. Tying this in to choice and commitment.
Approximations in planning, organization, etc.
Committing, etc.
Commitments and systems; general application of principles regardless of commitment-system.

0,2

Outline 2.

☆ denotes Main Heads ¶ DENOTES SUBHEADS

Here's a thoroughen try: (Should mix catchy and murky titles)

☆ LITTLE PATTERN AND BIG SYSTEM
QUESTIONS, EASY AND HARD

☆ THE GAME OF SEEKING TRUTH. Irrelevance of logic, definitions. Strategies of initiative and refutation.

#3

First player: insight.

FINDING OUT JUST WHAT YOUR INSIGHT IS. Hanging on awhile; 'not quite it.' Examples, as many as possible. What things, general or specific, you think it's related to.

PUTTING A WORD TO IT. (Restriction or invention of term. Or trying to phrase it.)

~~BEARING~~
BARING ITS BOSOM. (Making it refutable.)

2d player: CONTRADICTING PROPERLY.

Logic, the sucker's game (who could miss? & Defense
ANALYSIS. easy, through change.)
Disjunction of ordinary meanings.
Foul wording. (Santa Claus etc.) (Meanings can't be thrown out.)

MERE EVIDENCE. (Once it's thrown to that, the fun's over.)

ESCAPING THE NET; CASTING A FINER ONE; MANNERS OF THE GAME. (To finish the game-idea.)

☆ ESSENCES & TRUEST FORMS. A) Foggy ways of using these ideas; B) Clear way, i.e., looking for those sets of attributes which don't change...

CROSS-PREDICATION.

COMPONENTIAL ANALYSIS.

COMPLEX CONCEPTS that suggest much. (Harks to 'essences...')

0,3

Outline, 3

TRAVELING PATTERNS ('the same,' though changing)

~~XXX~~ STAGES, MODELS, PARTS & SIMILARITIES

SCALES, DICHOTOMIES, CONTINUA
APPROXIMATIONS

WHEN WE KNOW ENOUGH (patriarchal formulation)

PROCEDURE IN SOCIOLOGICAL RESEARCH.

THINGS LIKE THIS IN MAN'S WORLD.

APPROXIMATIONS OF DOING.

HOW ARRANGED? AND TO WHAT WORTH?
~~HOW GENERAL, AND HOW MUCH?~~ (Transferability of these;
~~XXX~~ utilitarian accountings)

☆ A NEW RING TO THE MORAL QUESTION.

THE LIMITATIONS BORN OF SOUL. (Commitment, etc.)

WORLDLY FEARS; AND GODSPEED.

0,4

Outline 4

I think this is it:

I. LITTLE PATTERN AND BIG SYSTEM
(Short intro.)

#4

II. THE GAME OF SEEKING TRUTH.

III. ESSENCES AND TRUEST FORMS.

IV. A NEW RING TO THE MORAL QUESTION.

To fill it in:

I. LITTLE PATTERN AND BIG SYSTEM.
- A. ~~Query~~ Where does it fit?
- B. Questions, easy and hard

#5

II. THE GAME OF SEEKING TRUTH.
- A. What is your insight?
- B. Putting a word to it.
- C. Baring its bosom.
- D. To contradict properly
- E. Mere evidence
- F. Breaking the net; manners

AND

III. ESSENCES & TRUEST FORMS.
- A. What is ~~xxxxxxxx~~ the thing really?
- B. Componential analysis.
- C. Approximations.
- D. ~~Exxxxxpredixxxixxx~~ Complex concepts
- E. Cross-predication.
- F. Stages, Models, Parts and Similarities
- G. Scales, dichotomies, continua
- H=D Traveling patterns
- ~~E~~ IV. When we know enough
- J. Procedure in sociological research
- K. Things like this in man's world

V. ~~IV.~~ A NEW RING TO THE MORAL QUESTION.

(~~xxxxxxxx~~xto next page)

0,5

Outline 5

IV. A NEW RING TO THE MORAL QUESTION.
A. How arranged? And to what worth?
B. The limitations born of soul.
C. Worldly fears; and godspeed.

To fill it in farther:

WAIT (title & introduction. Why not?)

~~I. LITTLE PATTERNS AND BIG SYSTEM.~~

A. Where does it fit? I have an insight. It is about the world, but what? I make a choice. How does it fit in with all my other choices, and what I should do? It is so like, and yet so unlike, other things.

B. Questions, easy and hard. "It depends on the definition." Yet can that be right? Is it so floppy as all that? Is there anything that does not depend on the definition, etc.?

?

#6

II. THE GAME OF SEEKING TRUTH. (Statements)

A. ~~What is your insight?~~
Finding out just what your insight is. Examples. Things it's related to; things that seem to be a part of the insight. Hanging on awhile, resisting the hard cold killer definitions.

B. Putting a word to it. Restricting or inventing a term. Or trying to phrase it the long way.

C. Baring its bosom. Making it refutable. When should this come? You can, of course, keep it "true by definition" as long as you like, but this is like a mother who finds her daughter so perfect that she shouldn't be exposed to the world: what good is she, and what will she have to say or do?

D. Contradicting properly. Logic, the sucker's game. ANALYSIS: disjunction of ordinary meanings. Foul wording (Santa Claus, Virginia.) Meanings can't be thrown out.

~~Breaking the net; manners.~~ To escape,

E. Breaking the net; manners. One may say, excuse me, I misspoke; what I really meant was; and re-attack, saying, very well, in that case. It is only proper to give proponent every chance, else straw man, fog man; but it is only proper to try to

EXAMPLES & quexx. of distorting words meaning — e.g. nothing at all good? ...

"FAMILIES OF MEANING"

0,6

clarify yourself to where the minds will meet.

F. First clarity. Getting past the "it depends on...;" to idea, "there is a kind of thing such that..." E.g. from "It depends on what you mean by International Menace" to "I think there exists an international movement such that.".

G. Mere evidence. Things become now a problem of mere evidence; the philosophy has subsided.

"I meant something else, something special." Then see below.

III. ESSENCES AND TRUEST FORMS. (Things, reality.)

A. What is the thing really? All this classic futzing around, "I think X really means, ..." won't do; neither will "The idea of an X implies a Y..." (since we have seen that the X, unless part of a thorough theory being advanced, or being very clearly used, doesn't have any clear implications, for insightful assertions usually do not.)

ignore this

When there are several claims on a term, we had better look at the theory, & other cross-predications on it.

A. What is the thing really? Rhetorically etc., this is a favorite kind of assertion; so is the truly-implies stuff.

But answer is that unless they can show the meaning of the term to be what they've said, what is it? Just moving a piece around on an empty board. Must be prepared to say what it means for a thing to be truer in this context, put a cowboy at the other end of the lasso.

B. Significance, relevance, clarity or importance of a predication: as shown in the light of the multiple-predication notion.

"Stages, Models, Parts & Similarities"

C. Stages, principal parts... as taking signfficance from their relation to other stuff.

D. It may develop that as theory improves, we begin to distinguish kinds of things very carefully (e.g. group). We may be then tempted to say we've found out what a group really is. CANNOT SO EASILY CUT CORD OF LG.

And of course, Scriv. problem that we can't find scientific definition except on a "temporary" basis.

IV. LITTLE PATTERN AND BIG SYSTEM. (Resemblance and fit-in.)

A. Resemblance in a universe of fact. (Notion of whittled-down generality, rather than spun-out.)

COMPONENTIAL ANALYSIS

Idea that a false generality may be merely a misstated one. Resemblances and families of resemblances: why noticing them should be encouraged.

B. Scales, dichotomies, continua. How comparisons, descriptions, measurings, may be in any ways applicable & reasonable-- toward learning, as

0,7

well as for the fun of it.
(These things show up, natch, as continuities & resemblances in the general flux.)

C. Commitment-principles. Aesthetic principles. Etc

KINDS OF APPROXIMATNS. we must seek, live with ...

TYPES existing somehow have influence of some kind ... → clinical-statistical ..

√ ~~IV~~ WHEN WE KNOW ENOUGH.

A. Complex (unbounded sharply) concepts; traveling patterns. ("Traveling patterns" is title.)

B. Procedure in sociological research: laugh may be on some certain guys when it's found out that the true variables vary just about like the words. Also (put this first) relation between op. def. & real language: can't disprove ordinary language; and when paradoxes use ord. language, can't disprove common sense.

C. Things that change thus.

VI A NEW RING TO THE MORAL QUESTION.

A. How arranged?

B. Society & Possibility. RATIONAL.

C. The limitations born of soul. PHILOSOPHIES OF LIFE.

D. Worldly fears; and godspeed.

0,8

TRUTH, MAN AND CHOICE.

False start, 3 September, 1960.

Paginated as follows: ~~i,x,i,x~~ 0, 0A, 0B, 1, 1Aw, 1B, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Cute but no cigar. Requires more thought, preferably a clearer track of thought in the early philosophy and -- well, I guess that is the main problem.

0,9

0

WAIT

I have an insight. Where does it fit? Even if I have just had a surge of knowing, and the sense that it is something about the world I have just learned, it is extremely difficult to say what it is. But I know it fits in somewhere.

The same can be said for a choice that I make. The world demands many choices, sometimes all too frequent ~~x~~ or painful; and in the choices it is often all too hard to keep hold of a framework of propriety or reason.

Fitting small things into an elusive whole-- sometimes it seems like trying to ~~xxxxx~~ step on shadows, or put the cat's meow in your pocket.

0,10

And questions-- or ideas-- or choices-- can at times be most insistent/in their demands upon our minds, although and painful they lack clear bearing on their lives. ~~Exx~~ Like far-off shouting, or a smell that ~~jxxx~~ half calls back a ~~xxxxxxxx~~ reminiscence, they require attention for their own sake. That is, for the sake of understanding them.

In this little book I will present a number of thoughts, none difficult or important by itself, such as may make a number of things clear to other people. The title itself is such a~~x~~ sockdologer that I dare not say much more about what the book is about, but had better get right to it, and hope that afterward the reader might agree the title was as good as any other, and better than many. But let me say that I am not dealing with ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ such problems of modern technical philosophy as ontology, or mind and body, or high-class meaning analysis. Logic, yes, ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ lightly; but most of all I want to pick at the ideas of causation, construct, pattern, structure, & complex predication, of the kind with which social science is today so busy. You might say

0,11

There are many interesting questions called "philosophical" OB
by those untrained in technical Philosophy.
there is secret purpose in this,/~~for~~ It will be revealed

presently why I think these are one with certain questions

in the philosophy of sociology. Thus I hope my analysis

is adequate to them both,

Of the last part, what? There are clear reasons it

belongs with the rest; yet in many ways it seems a gratuitous

throw-in. Let me explain it this way: I have attempted

to write the book I wish/~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ some magician had placed in my hands

when I was thirteen. If anyone reading this is like me

when I was thirteen-- and I hope lots of people are, I was

better then-- it may bring clearness in complexity to

what was simple fog. If not, no apologies, for we can't all

worry about the same things.

0,12

TRUTH, MAN AND CHOICE.
~~TRUTH~~

Section one. THE GAME OF SEEKING TRUTH.

FINDING OUT JUST WHAT YOUR INSIGHT IS.

We all have insights, and ideas, and having them is one of life's pleasures. Some of us stop there, perhaps to tie the idea to whatever words are handy, and throw it into the world, and forget it. Thus at a cocktail party you might say, "but love and hate are really the same thing, aren't they?" or "True beauty is beyond appreciation," or "There is more to man than can ever be known," and you, or your hearer, or both, with luck, may think-- "How profound!" I have often heard people say that to try to analyze ideas is to mutilate and crush them, and when you

0,13

THE GAME OF SEEKING TRUTH.

Truth has been called many things, and fortunately seeking it. Instead of the truth itself I will takk about/ we will not have to go into them./ I am going to use the metaphor of a game, not for any terribly deep reason, except to suggest that when you think a thing is so, there is another fellow out to get you who says it isn't. You must watch out for him, and know the kinds of places he will ambush you. There is a special feature of this game, that is, that if you are successfully ambushed, you change sides, that is, change your mind and lay yourself open to new attacks.

Everyone who has read a book will recognize this metaphor, of course, as the model of scholastic controversy. In the academic game, if a man proposes ax theory, he is only holding it up for others to shoot at. This is more or less a

0,14

if no one's feelings are hurt,
proper thing,/because it keeps everyone interested and

people get paid for it, or promoted.

0,15

try to talk exactly you tear the wings off your ideas, as though they had been butterflies, leaving only something small and creepy.

There is an alternative view, however; let me express it also first in butterflies. If to try to make an idea precise is to tear the wings off it, then to say it quickly with but handy words is to tie a stone to it, and throw the stone away.

One last thing you can do with a living butterfly is blow it from your hand, and watch it carefully with your eye, and see if it goes in a direction you would like to follow.

Let us discuss such a butterfly. Suppose I am walking along one day, and observing my fellow men in the street. I have an idea. "All men are really brothers," I say, and then pin down just why: "Because they are all lost."

Now that is an interesting statement. Let's see what the things are that I could do with it. Well, "brothers" means such-and-such; "lost" means thus-and-so. Therefore my insight reduces to "All men are children of the same parents, because we can none of us get to where we want to

go?" That's asinine. Lots of people get where they want, and many people aren't ~~xxxxxx~~ even second cousins to each other. I say, well, that's not just what I meant by "brothers" or "lost"; a voice then asks, "Well, what do you mean? Define your terms."

If I am wise, at least on this point, I do not answer. I say, "Wait, I am not sure; let me think awhile." This is the right answer, for ~~xxx~~ once throw your insight to the~~xx~~ hard cold killer definitions, and it is as if you had not had it, for it can be pounced on.

But if I look back quickly ~~xxx~~ along the street, and can remember what things first brought me the thought, it may come clearer. I saw a man stop and look at his watch. Another man looked extremely worried. "Ah," I say, "My thought was more like this: "We are all alike, ~~xxx~~ in this respect: we worry about things, and have to keep referring to the world to make sure things are all right."

~~thus was a first sample~~

This is a first sample, rather simple-minded, of the kind of statement, or ~~xx~~ question-- statements and questions

0,17

are very much alike-- that can be helped with analysis.

But often they do not fall to clarity so soon. ~~xxxxxx~~

Finding the examples, and hanging onto your related thoughts,

and things that seem to be part of it, will always help.

EXAMPLES, EXAMPLES, EXAMPLES, EXAMPLES, EXAMPLES, EXAMPLES!

PUTTING A WORD TO IT.

Very often, whatever the thought was, you must ~~xxxxxx~~

clothe it in
~~xx~~ words before it is completely clear to you, rather than

have it run around naked in your mind. Perhaps there is

a general term you want to use, for, say, a family of

things you believe deserve to be described together. The

term may be already in the language, lustrously awaiting you,

or you may invent one; either may be permitted. Or you may

take a lot of words and fit them together one-by-one.

0,18

BARING ITS BOSOM.

Having not said what you mean with terrible clarity, you may feel extremely possessive about your insight. This is understandable; for the people who will be contradicting you will be people who want to do just that. But it is your insight, and you may choose the way and place of its unveiling; in a duel, the challenger does not choose weapons.

But it must be done. Otherwise you are like a mother who finds her daughter so perfect she can't/speak to anbody. be allowed to

Your special terms must be

S-0,225

I will close your "A" Neigh & decide they so-sure you handed in assignments & saw the Exam but decided to take it for legitimate reasons of course

There is no carbon. Please return to:
Ted Nelson
88 Central Park W.
New York 23, N.Y.
Thank you.

I could use your work of a crude biased character papers - 1st paper uses quite superficial & inadequate texts - needs like your personal charge for your own benefit, I am sorry I agreed to this assignment - would have been more profitable (for you to read substantial

On Zetterberg.

The axiomatic xtxwpxtxxxwf view in theory construction is most handsomely set out in x Hans Zetterberg's little book, On Theory and Verification in Sociology. (Stockholm, 1954.) And if some of his claims are a little too strong, he has nowthwvtwvs done no disservice to anyone by setting them forth well.

The axiomatic approach is, of course, that method of theory construction in which statements are set forth with the greatest possible care, xxxtxxt such that their entailments are entirely clear: txxxtxxx so crisply, in other words, that logical deduction is appropriate, with no gaps for guessing. twwsmwfwtwwrmpowmtwtwtw wtwvwwrwmg hmmodwl

Here are his claims for txxxxxxxtx axiomatic theories:

"1) they offer the most parsimonious summary of research findings;

"2) they have the highest plausibility per amount of supporting data;

"3) they facilitate the location of strategic research problems;

"4) they facilitate the location of the source of an error in the verification enterprise;

"5) they facilitate the distinction between definitions and hypotheses." (P. 72)

Let me try to comment on these, fixxt generally, and then make a general rejoinder, tangential to them.

twwtowwatmoutmawthwowywwwxtwwawthwmfwwww

1) Axiomatic form is indeed parsimonious; it is the briskest way to say anything. Any theory can most crisply be set forth in a list of statement. Butwwwwwww thw But to call this the most parsimonious summary of research findings is a different thing: for although our thwwrtwwwwwy findings may be in line with a theory, or may have generated the theory, it is not the findings we xxt fxr summarize, but the theory itself. tx If anyone is to look at our fixxtxxgxx findings, he must examine the way in which we found them-- and this cannot be axiomatized, but requires looking over experimental design, coders' instructions, etc.

thw

fwwwdwywwwwxrwwwww

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B-0,226

It may seem that I am here cavilling over terms, what "findings" are; I think not. Although it is common to talk about research "findings" in the sense of distilled theoretical conclusions, the question of what a researcher has really found is a question that may always be re-opened. Hence, the parsimonious summary is not, strictly, of "findings," but of confirmed (or disconfirmed) theory. By making this point I wish only to break the impression, fostered by his phrasing, that the axiomatic method here can be cut loose from theory and tied strictly to the data.

2) I take this to be, not a point about salesmanship, which no one will admit to a rightful place in cognitive endeavor, but rather a point about organization. I think he means, rather, that a theory set forth carefully will make its data fit into place more clearly than a theory which is not. But no one would ever deny this.

He might, on the other hand, be suggesting that data fit more specifically to an axiomatic theory if, e.g., a list of "theorems" is derived, and next to each is set forth a research result--as if to counter each question the critic might ask. But this is salesmanship.

3) This is the best point. Because of the manipulability of the axiomatic method-- through symbolic logic, etc.-- it is possible to check much more thoroughly through the theory for problems which can be pursued with the methods and facilities on hand. As a matter of convenience, this manipulability is a distinct advantage.

However, "strategic" has stronger senses which we might look at. One is the sense of "crucial," sine qua non; but axiomatizing is of no special aid in finding these; rather it is our understanding of the theory as a whole that leads us to its strong, weak or most debatable points.

4) The axiomatic theory can lead us to "a source of error in the verificational enterprise" only if we are dead sure a theory is true and have found a disconfirmation which we want to ferret out, i.e., keep doing over until it comes out right. If we are not that sure, however, and want to know what to do about the theory, the axiomatic method is of no help at all. I will discuss this below.

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S-O,227

(It is debated which of Newton's laws are definitional.)

5) I see no reason for distinguishing between definitions and hypotheses. Naturally, it is elegant when we are very sure of a theory to split such hairs; but when the chips are down, and there is disconfirmation to be grappled with, it is of little use to know which were which. As a measure of our certainty before disconfirmation, as to what parts of the theory were more general or more basic, the distinction of definition and hypothesis is perfectly reasonable. But we need not be bound by it when it is time to reconstruct.

This leads me to the general, simple problem that axiomatic theory cannot cope with. In the face of disconfirmation, it well may be that something very like our theory is still the true one; and the fact that we have reduced the original theory, a minimal set of propositions, is no more guide than a short set of directions which has failed to get us to Mandel Hall.

Let us take the simplest case, that in which the theory as set forth axiomatically is true-- but the concepts of the theory have been incorrectly interpreted. Here, in other words, our "operational definitions" are incorrect, the categories we deal with have been wrongly bounded, but all the propositions hold. For instance, in the classic studies of frustration and aggression, suppose it had turned out that certain obvious instances of frustration were not followed by aggression. Here, true, we can correct, and change the category-boundaries in order to save a theory with strong bones; say that these cases were not "true" frustration, on account of their not fitting the theory. This example would be too trivial to mention, if it were not ignored by Zetterberg's approach. Where he says that the axiomatic theories "facilitate the location of the source of error,..." we are prone to think he means we can find what's wrong in the theory; and I am sure he cannot mean that.

Now to the trickier problem. Suppose we were to perform all the possible deductions from an axiomatic theory. It is quite possible that a number of them will be true, a number false, and that some kind of repair needs to be performed, involving the addition of new axioms (say, legislating there to be two kinds of a thing) or the substitution of some, or merely a deletion. Worst, it might be a mixed

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S-0,228

problem: some "interpretations" (category-boundaries) wrong, as well as systemic repair needed.

Category-boundaries = interpretation

Of course, having gone this far is tantamount to saying any theory in sociology is true-- but, to the depth of a few inches, I am willing to make that assertion. There are blessed few theories in Sociology that are not "partly" true, that do not apply in some situations or have some contributory force. (I except, ~~[illegible]~~ historical theories, and those, say, dealing with "the most powerful influence" in thus-and-such a situation.

Do you really need this?

Which leads into the question of deciding among conflicting, and apparently disparate, theories-- let me list Freud's Oedipus, Thomas' Four Wishes, Jung's racial consciousness. Taking these theories sympathetically, it is difficult to say how they relate to one another, and difficult to reject any of them out of hand. Because of this, Operationalism-- and, on the more sophisticated level, Zetterberg-- has tried to erect a boxing-arena where theories can be pitted against each other for good and all.

Seems easy to relate them? + easier to reject them

But unfortunately this is not possible. The real difficulty with living theories, I think, is to align them properly with respect to one another; and because they are different theories, they do not sound like enough for thumping contrasts. Whatever conflicts we find in them are vague and obscure, dealing with the more complex and hypothetical things than we have seen or validated. And it will not necessarily be clear whether two theories are really parallel (co-expressible, synonymous, or conflicting) or tangential (dealing with different matters.) While this uncertainty persists, ~~[illegible]~~ and while we allow ourselves to stay interested in things not bright-colored or edible, the axiomatic method will be of no help. The axiomatic method is suited to problems with disjunctive answers; where if A is false, then the alternatives, B, C and D can be listed.

Boom-Boom

no need for new paraoraph unless for dramatic emphasis

The only alternative approach I can suggest is that of careful analysis: not to find the meaning of a theory, but the meanings: to look for all the things our interesting theory can interestingly mean, and weave these disjuncts into a much finer mesh-- trying to find all the different ways they can combine, rather than pretending we have resolved something when we have knocked over one particular interpretation.

So you favor "open" analysis rather than dogmatic closure — Fine!

Concurrently, in our new theories, be as careful as possible-- but not fear ambiguities or unclarities when we have no better obvious, and precisify insights only at the speed of combined thought and research (slower than either.)

What are you saying?

The last point should now be apparent: that where other people wish to point out the inadequacy and

OK — but there would be considerable delay in getting theory "off the ground" — or do you plan to research your theory?

your alternative is quite meaningless the way you present it —

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S-0,229

crudity of ordinary-language theories in the everyday context, for explaining human action, I wish to hammer on the extraordinary goodness of ordinary language: that the unclarities of ordinary language possibly show insights and subtleties that social science will need later, and we had better draw our theories with care if we use ordinary language. "He is mad" mean" could refer to a lot of things; I think it is clear what kinds of things it probably means, even though no context-independent criteria could be found. "Emotion," "family," "culture," all may seem imprecise--but may refer to groupings that will turn up in our analysis later; hence changes in the meaning of ordinary terms should be wary indeed.

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TMC: ESCROW

$1,256

SRC

DISJUNCTIVE REVELATION & AMBIGUITY

is crucial.

S1,54

TMC

'AMBIGUITY'

Circumstances & configurations and ANCHORS lead people to treat extremely important points as 'details,' (and treat as 'important' things which don't come up very often.)

FORMER VERY IMPORTANT POINT. #00428

→ 'DETAILS' ARE THINGS WHICH AREN'T FOUGHT OVER BY LEGISLATORS ETC. BUT ARE LEFT TO SOMEBODY.

S1, 121

SAX - KPD

REFERENCE CONCEPTS

&

REFERENCE POINTS in general

(incl. Neg. RC's & RF's)

#00415

S1,119

CDHS

The gourmet who sees that his son (by a divorced wife, say) will grow up liking canned peas.

⇨ HOW DEAL WITH IT?

#00386

S1,93

TMC

★ possible sub-outline ★

IDEAS

Reference concepts ★

primary
derivative

Simple ideas

Clusters of ideas

Ideas induced from real world in clusters

!

Trying to use or pin 'em down

{ DEFINING
CRITERIALIZING

{ ONGOING WHOLES

#00418

~~S1,~~ S1,92

SEX. NORX INSEPARABILITY OF PRESCRIPTIVE AND DESCRIPTIVE.

1) In any description that may influence action, the slant of the words will have an important effect.

2) In choosing categories for future description, you determine the way that individual cases will come out. ~~LARGE CONFIGURATIONS~~

~~3) You may have to choose them with a mind to how they will fit the natural groupings.~~

3) You may have to choose them with a mind to how they will fit the natural groupings.

4) LIKE ANY OP. ANAL. PROBLEM. What exx will tell you the most and get you the most?

#00416

SL,94

TMC more reasons.

Technology & politics make an incredibly wide range of future worlds possible. If many of them are very ugly, we must look for a systematic way of thinking about them... (?)

...everyday irrevocable and thoughtless decisions are being made... no attempt made to plan the things that must be planned, and un-plan the things that must not.

#00301

$1,95

SKX, IR

How will you spreadeagle the facts?

The same large complex can be described all different ways, with differential consequences for

PHENOMENOLOGY (thinking about it)

IR — things may be forgotten, ignored or unavailable.

#00416

~~76~~ 51, 76

TMC Org. ☆

RCI { ~~RCI~~
HOW PEOPLE'S IDEAS AFFECT THEIR ACTIONS

CDHS { HOW OTHERS ACT ON ~~BASIS~~ ~~OF~~ THEIR IDEAS OF YOUR IDEAS. #00420

S1,61

REFERENCE CONCEPTS

are

elements of a schematic, or measuring-pattern,

~~which are used in the application as criteria for the application of that pattern.~~

'Systematics' [OR, they are points or things with reference to which a thing moves, from which it takes orientation, etc.

The most commonplace reference concepts are those things which we take into account, or act with reference to (though we may seem to act with reference to others, for some reason.)

S1, 96

WB1R.

NORX
~~FRANSK~~

The old, distinct modalities of 'writing' and 'just talking' — a valuable distraction when academic honor is on the block — may become eroded.

#00376

NORX
~~FRANSK~~

Modalities of secret records will undoubtedly come to be, sentences whispered to ears of just the right sensibility. But this is at once desirable and ugly ...

#00376

$1,98

CDHS

!

~~WORK OF ART~~

What are proper media now that all's possible?
Drippy brushes? Hand litho? ... etc.
Why preserve hand-doing or individual artist's identity
in a collaborative effort?

!

~~#00439~~ #00212
#00219

S+,99

Skx

Why confuse Good Mnemonic Sequencing with presentational order?

#00314

NORX

How to write a didactic book, teach a course: Mnemonic sequencing as well as good presentational order.

#00314

$1,100

NORX

SYSTEMS OF INFO GATHERING & process
& their characteristic defects.

News articles-- their chstc organization (lose at bottom)-- Milton Mayer story
'Contacts,' leads-- obscure truth? Reward far viewpoint-- maybe that too.

Advisers to the king. Own swords to grind, break of contact with what's really happening.

#00314

$1,103

NORX INFORMATION FOR COMPATIBILITY

You want to tell someone all the details but it turns out they don't want to know.

#00313

S1,104

TMC

Let last part of Skx Proper be on equivalence of words & socsci variables1. Then (in MANX) do an outline of concept-pattern similarity, turning later to resemblant systems of free will, love...

#00313

Skx PATTERN

Superimposed-- discerned? (Skx)

Established (NORX)

JUSTIFIED (Skx, Norx)

Having interesting effects (Manx)

#00313

SPLIT

S2,106 MOTIVATIONAL MEASUREMENT

NORX/SRC

PRINCESS-TASKS. Gotta do to prove you're worth it; i.e., strong enough & care enough. (Preferred man can get simpler task.)

ON THE JOB you must put goal out of mind, commit yourself to goal w/o thinking.

ON MOTIVATION (CDHS)

#00313

S1,107

NORX Emotional commitment

DREAMS & 'it all was a dream'

Said at end of story-- establish modality, prevent cognitive disappt.

May be disappointment, when you wake up.

Useful in clearing away memories to which you shouldn't be committed any more (they'll hurt you.) If you can get a partner to agree it was all a dream, all the better.

#00313

$1,109

NORX

CONSUMER REPORTS

#00313

S1,110

Skx

'INFERIORITY' feelings
'HOSTILITY' feelings

-- Are they <u>necessary</u> clumpings?

To find out, must examine theoretical considerations like etiology etc.

~~#00434~~
#00312

S1,111

Skx/ Kpts

THE MYSTERIOUS

-- anthropologists have taken note: the mysterious ~~x~~ exists within a culture as well as from outside it.

~~#00484~~
#00312

S1,113

SKX MPP

Aesthetics of conventions-- e.g. clothes, their color combinations & 'considered' parts-- subject to surprising variations & reversals.

#00311
#00311

S1,114

Skx

TRUE ANALYTICALLY
ASSERTED
INTERESTING HYPOTHESIS
AXIOM

TRUTH-values in a presentational-order analysis

#00314

S1, 115

Skx /AESTH

Certain smells have come to be associated with V bathroom perfumes, public and so serve as pivot points etc in the domain of smell.

#08391

S1,116

Skx

One person can look like many others
who do not look like each other.

#00391

S1,117

Skx Mpp

Do all cultures separate magic from science from religion?

WHO DIVIDES WHAT FROM WHAT?

AND IF THEY DO — ~~ARE~~ DO THE CORRESPONDENT PARTS SHIFT ON SOME KIND OF FIELD?

#00347

S1,120

CDHS.

~~FMC~~

~~Psychology & work~~

Just the way

- ATTITUDES are importantly & trickily related to DOING THINGS (though there are discrete strategies)
- GRAT-STRUX is trickily related to the distribution of satisfaction amid accomplishment in society.

#00410

S1, 124

Skx

CHANGE OF SPRANGER THEORY FROM DISCRETE TYPES TO SCALE

#00418
#00418

S1, ~~150~~ 127

TMC

Consider your mind to be a map room, with many maps which fit together in patchwork ways, & whose relationship changes. Some maps are only of relationships between discrete units — like airway route maps; others explain terrain, directions and apparent motion.

~~(Consider the many things~~

#00418

S1,128

8kx

It would seem that extensionally
→ intensionally you can throw a
dimension among any number of things.

#00412

S1,129

MOTIVATION & BELIEF? BELIEF-SYSTEM-COMMITMENT?

OPENNESS OF A CONCEPTUAL SYSTEM

e.g. permeability of a religion by a stranger's God.

#00434

S1, 130

(CDHS)

~~NORX~~

Systems of payment
&
Systems of gratitude
both evaluable
→ but different. Latter is more clearly involved with payoff-rearrangement.

#00421

S1, 133

TMC Intro

This is the kind of philosophy book which is too general to praise or blame anything. For this it might be criticized. ~~as a~~ I do not mean to suggest we live in the best of all possible worlds, but neither can I find relevance between the world's problems as an individual man must confront them and the very general ques. I hope to attack here.

#0041

81, 134

8kx

Columbia wanted John ~~Mast~~ Mason for President but the terms of its endowment said president had to be Episcopalian — William Harris got job, & man they wanted was made "provost" w. all original powers.

#0041

S1, 135

Skx

A particular recipe may ~~[illegible]~~ evolve in any ~~directions~~ — say, a pot pie could evolve toward pastry or stew.

BUT POUND CAKE is anchored.

#00420

S1,138

S1x

WHETHER A THING CAN BE STUDIED IN ISOLATION
DEPENDS ON WHETHER THE
BACKGROUND WILL STAND STILL.
(OR, WHETHER SIMPLIFYING ASSUMPTIONS
WILL SOMEHOW ~~MAKE~~ IT STAND STILL:
THAT IS, BY UNDULATING VERY REGULARLY.)

#00420

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S-0,39

INTRO 1.

I think that calm philosophic analysis can still furnish guide and understanding to empirical research...

I think I was right after all about "Schematics...", but left out the most important point.

To rush cattycorners across the universe of human intellect smacks dilettantishly...

However, once all is clear it may be that I am saying less than it may seem at first; and where other people are also right, I seek only to explicate the way they might be.

This is not (though resembles) Gestalt schools of Psych. & Phil.

... This may be a callow book; I have not read much. However, it is the arguments that count, rather than the mellowness or erudition, and the arguments could have occurred to anyone without reading at all. However, it is unlikely that they could be clear at all, without examples or things to contrast with... I may be wrong, but I hope I am honestly and coherently wrong, rather than just confused. I really can't think of what would show me to be wrong, and I have certainly tried (except a coup in sociology by the methods I disapprove of;) but perhaps freshmen to these arguments will find the edge I have unconsciously learned to avoid.

Whole damn thing was inspired by TALCOTT PARSONS soph. yr. But I never realized.

A PERSONAL STATEMENT.

1. Great concern. With things of mind, heart, society, etc.
2. Vehement denial. Of certain kinds of things people would tell me.
3. Not any more do I have the vehemence-- or deny the same things so categorically; not because I have "sold out," or stopped being dissatisfied with certain statements; but my dissatisfaction and philosophic influence taken on all-the-more corporal form.
4. High school-- the semanticists. Freshman year-- Whorf. Sophomore year-- Parsons, structural linguistics. Junior year-- Oxford-Minnesota philosophy.
5. Difficulty with too much passion (Cf. Frost's "Two Tramps in Mud Time.") College requirements were a formal interference with my own program.
6. This is the only historical note. For anybody who wants to go back to "Schematics" -- as I dare not-- or understand what I said to him at some past time, it is ~~probably~~ all here.

S-0,40

I have reached the end of a certain set of intellectual labors, which at their end, in the most Proustian way, permit me to better understand the beginning.

While this is not the last word, I think it may be firm enough to sustain the new kinds of thinking I want to start now. There is utility in Parsons' kind of theorizing, though I am not yet familiar enough to comment on it.

It was Junior year that Scriv suggested to his seminar that they pass out papers among themselves... I took that very seriously...

... Certain philosophical issues which burned in my head when I was a clever, uncooperative child...

...my personal influences have been unaware of the fire onto which they were thrown...

I have come to the end of a long intellectual journey, and in these pages I set down my load.

On future trips I think my luggage will be safe where I have left it.

Now that my objections are formulated better, I see that they are fewer and less general than I had thought...

Where I once tried to apply these things to Learning Theory, I now think the thesis is true but trivial...
i.e., a learning-theory that could be disproved by nothing would probably not be of very much value-- but my sympathy with ideal types & conceptual categories is such as to make me probably [illegible] in the last cause a sincere one-- but I say "probably" sincerely, for my sympathy with ideal types and conceptual categories is quite thorough.

Sudden apparition of Talcott Parsons in my intellectual past...

Not all my questions are answered here, but most.

Promissory Note:
I hope to deal later with Parsons' THEORY OF THE BIG CULTURE, (Also: Herskovits? Kroeber?) for this is one of the notions I have immemorially hated for private peasons. I no longer seek to refute, of course, for trying to refute on strictly logical grounds misses. There are few collisions when one nebula passes through another.)

*
THE INDIVIDUAL MUST GIVE WAY TO THE GROUP etc.
As moral and factual matters, these formulations are no longer relevant to my life or self-defense; but they are still such interesting questions...

S-0, 41

...imprisoned in my own insights, unable to phrase comments and arguments in a way that others could understand...

This short book on the philosophy of sociology has three principal points:

TECHNIQUES, etc. of Socy; Phil-of-Sci.
Metaphysics & delicate insight-theories & meaning.
Action & premises, etc.
MORAL CONSIDERATION & Util. Calculus

And I believe that is really the only proper order to get there.

Notes also on the good or bad of industrialism, urbanization, etc. -- Which is all too soon dismissed by people, kicked into a metaphysical realm.

Those who do not believe it possible to argue from first principles should not thereby cut themselves off from piece-by-piece criticism of this.

... an unbecoming theoretical sweep...

As Simmel said, study is bounded by metaphysics. On this account, one may proceed this way if he sees light through jungle.

This has been written hurriedly, because of the academic schedule here, and because I have been less and less able to communicate with anyone on any subject-- because of the inaccessibility of my whole theoretical structure to the people I try to show a fragment to.

This, a first draft, is really a slightly abridged life work which has been finished ahead of schedule.

This is a life-work which I have had the fortune to finish early.

A bibliography can be written in, anecdotes and quotations supplied, . .
...but herein may be clearly followed all the arguments I call my own.

This is not Sociology. No conceivable research could have any bearing on it. This is not straight philosophy, since it deals with the facts about man: what they are or could be, and their relevance to choice.

Perhaps putting all these things into one volume will make it less attractive to those interested in only one part of it.

S-0,42

Intro 4

It is late in the game for built theories. Brilliant men have filled centuries with intricate systems of thought, and we are tempted (if we lack the time to examine) to dismiss their creations as futile speculation.

This book resembles the systems of an Aquinas, a Spinoza, Marx or Bosanquet enough to be classified as a built system. I begin, indeed, by setting forth a system of logic; then using it as a sieve for studying, in turn, the Philosophy of Sociology, categories in human life, and decision-making; with suggestions on the way that there are implications here for religion, morals and personal commitment. And there are such implications. I do not spin them out because these are battles I do not wish to join here.

But this work is, in fact, more modest than I have suggested. If my system marches from pole to pole, it is not because I am unspeakably brilliant but because I have had certain insights and have been taught certain techniques of analysis. From these, oiled by certain interests of my own, the consequences leap.

First, I try to analyze patterns in general and Sociological theories in particular, and when I have criticized some contrary thinkers, that is the end of Section One. Then I apply the notions of 'category' and 'gradient' (???) to the world of human affairs, showing the fundamental similarities of law and various other human affairs. In section three, I try to ascertain why even given all the knowledge we could have, there is still so dreadful much trouble deciding things, and when I have done that the book is over.

Perhaps that is enough, but I must also comment on the greatest issue-- and it is a semi-moral one-- that the world has ever known, and that is today's armaments deadlock. While everyone agrees it has many philosophical aspects, we are none of us sure what they are, and everyone tries to relate it to something else...

I have a dreadful suspicion that the first section is only a prolegomenon to a philosophical examination of the work of Talcott Parsons-- which, at the moment, I am not competent to do.

This does not have the trappings of professional philosophy-of-science, which would make it so much more official-looking: symbolic logic, and all that.

It is for me both a surprise and a pleasure to present between covers all of the original thoughts I have ever had.

The widespread perplexity which greeted "Schematics, Systematics, Normatics" embarrassed me into dropping the whole matter from May'58 until March '60, when I suddenly realized I had been right along. This is good grist for the sociologists-of-knowledge, and their assertion that intellectual activities require a certain milieu. I had not expected that a functioning intellectual could be shamed away from an approach.

S-0,43

The philosophical view I put forth here, while it undoubtedly has its tender spots, is every bit as good as the naive positivism that has found its way into social science, and not half so wasteful of theories.

The presumptuous hope that this may serve also as an introduction to philosophy for the general reader ... a biassed introduction, but perhaps the more enlightening for being so...

My terms, "Schematics, Systematics, Normatics," may not be permanently shelved.

S-0,44

Four Thoughts on the Philosophy of Sociology and Choice.

An outline.

~~I. Theories and such~~.

Extralogic. Of Descriptions.

~~Section~~ 1. ~~The logic, or extralogic, of descriptions~~

1.

A. All the kinds of similarities.
  a. Categories, instances, relations
  b. Inversions, projections, rephrasings
B. The many categories-- the "that-whiches"
C. Option & similarity. "Same thing" is question-begging. Adumbrate the general potential of this option
D. General formulations. (The formulation which covers the family.) Acceptable inversions of the general formulation.
E. Super-generalities. (Do not tie in with Substrux.)

c. Similarities

~~Section 2. Procedure in a developing study~~

~~(Several-sided, tie in with other things.)~~

(May guide & restrict...)

F. TENACITY. Given these things in a system, the question is what parts of it will be defining of the system or its parts. (This is the ultimate case, when we are deadsure. Usually it's a scale...)

⇒ Appropriacy of tenacities.

S-0, 45

AP

1. I want to talk about a single problem which appears in a great number of fields. It is a topic virtually as general as logic itself-- though it might better be called "prelogic," or "the extralogical."

Logic may be said to deal with instances, categories, and relations;and the sphere in which logical deduction may be examined for its validity is that where these things appear in precise formulations, one part and another.

But logic is scarcely any help at all in dealing with substantive problems: for logic is not ready to go to work until the subject is already cut and dried.

I want to deal with the prelogical problems in a general way. It is this: what are the correct formulations? This question seems to want to shortcircuit the whole of science and cognitive inquiry; but does it?

Given a hunch about the world, what is its correct formulation? There might be conceived any number, on different levels ****/brings me to substructure too soon/

turns B red."

Given an insight, and a rough formulation of it-- say, "A/

S-0,46

SIMILARITIES & CONFLICTIONS. ⇦

Four thoughts on the Philosophy of Sociology and Choice.

SECTION ONE.

1. I am going to discuss things which are outside of logic proper; they come before logic has any bearing; they comprise all the real problems of science; they have such generality that they extend well past the mere cognitive. We should all examine them.

We might say that extralogic is the zone of option around logic: when attempting precise statements that will meet the logical form, what are the various things we might consider? What are thefamilies of statements that resemble one such set? etc.

2. Logic initially may be discussed as dealing with categories, instances, relations. Attendant to these things are boundaries, fields of applicability, inversions, projections.

And what are the various changes etc. Possible? Well, we may be interested in what instances fit in the general categories. Across what fields of instances can a set of categories be applied? ~~(No answer here, but we'll throw light.)~~ Changing the ~~nature of~~ boundaries will change what instances are in what categories without changing the fields. ~~Changing the relation of categories to categories (or instances to instances (This is sort of semantic.) (Also semantic is~~ Also relations: among instances and categories, categories & categories, instances & instances. WE DO NOT CONSIDER THE SEMANTICS OF THE THING luckily-- just all these things in the abstract.)

S-0,47

kinds of ways f's can be similar.

3. There are certain flexibilities,/ We can ~~xkixxx~~ make many inversions of a formulation-- express the one thing in terms of others, take categories as instances...

There can be projections of a formulation , in which certain new things are introduced.

[... There can be rephrasings ...]

There can be general similarities between formulations which could be related only by a series of the above, but of which we may ~~sa~~y the resemblances are very striking.~~x~~ Something about the formulation-- the fact that there are several levels etc.-- makes us want to say they are ~~xxx~~ similar.

4. The "that-which" business. Relation of IS.

A formulation may be regarded as a lot of "that-whiches."

Each category and its complement, each ~~xxxxxxx~~ relationx, glued are ~~xxxxxx~~ together. (Let me call this a "joint.") A lot of "t-w's" cemented by IS.

SAMENESS & GENERALITY& TENACITY.

5. A ~~xxx~~eneral formulation is one which ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ covers a lot of similar things. [But this is circular, for we call things "similar" ~~x~~insofar as they may be described by the generalfofmulation.., vG]

~~Crosswgeneralwformulationsmwightmbewcallwedmthan~~

~~&xxxxxxxxxxx

S-0,48

of a technical nature, which we are free to spin as our thoughts recommend.

Now we may have a general lot of other theory to tie in our subject with. And the way these more general categories subsume the earlier ones -- in a several-sided and tie-in manner-- may warm the heart.

OPTION, an option...

TENACITY. What commitments of a formulation shall be the abiding ones, as we seek a general formulation or to make tie-in? (It might be suggested that we are looking for parts which will be defining of the system or its parts. This is a serious question, for there is an awfully strong case that definitions (STRONG DEFINING PROPERTY) do not exist in science/.. Let us just say there are degrees of tenacity, and the question is what attributes of a formulation are to be the more or less stable. Let us rephrase this question: when is it more appropriate to be tenacious about a part of a formulation?

S-0,49

Section I. The reasons we should <u>hold off</u> and not decide, which properties of a formulation are more tenacious.

Section II. Times and places we must consider families of "configurations", ~~without attempting definitions, but when~~ attempting, as a rule, analysis, and sturdy findings.
("Definition" serious mistake.)

HISTORY OF IDEAS

CLUSTER-VARIABLES OF HUMAN LIFE
class, family, values, ...

LAW

Section III. ~~Times and places~~ The difficulties of choice. How the options of the extralogical are confounded.

False problems: Conditionality; uncertainty. (BUT <u>mixed</u> clinical-statistical problem...) not theoretical, only practical

True problems: Free will ('enough rope,' etc.)
Extensional preference paradox.
~~(Any formulation must have an unjustification.~~
~~The only formulation of~~
(We can only evaluate a formulation on the basis of other formulations or extensionally. But any extensional evaluation is either a preference & unjustified or based on a rule.)

S-0,50

THE ARMAGEDDON-PAPER. Organization.

Private preface, or "Confession"

~~Academic Preface~~

~~Preface to the General Reader~~

This was the old OPRSP program;

1. "How people act sometimes."
II 2. Legal categories.
III 3. How to go through a supermarket.
II 4. Values: boundaries, configurations, upshot ("Apparent Values.")
? 5. Can an explanation of action in terms of feelings be true?
II&III 6. Dustin-problem
II& III 7. "R" Mopup.

Some proposed sections for the Armageddon-Paper.

Section I. "On Theory and Definition in Sociology."

DESCRIPTION-SPACE. → "On the Logic of Patterns"

The use of ordinary language in social research.

Is the Axiological Approach Fair to Theories?

Zetterberg on definition and programatics.

Schematics Mopup.

UNWINDING A HUNCH or building a theory.

DISPROOF AND STULTIFICATION ("embarrassment" of a theory.)

(The former appropriate when theory has precise ("deductive") origin; the latter more appropriate in social sciences.

THE USE OF EVERYDAY LANGUAGE IN THEORIES.

S-0,51

Section I continued.

The extension of the linguistic model.

The badness of defining in general (clarity is fine; but defining is dangerous)

In fact, tell all you know about your theory, so we can improve on it later —

Badness of axiological approach in Sociology.

Substratum: best wishes but N.G. as an approach at this moment.
(Maybe there IS none, in some interesting sense.)

On operationalizing and disencircling slowly.

On the analyzability of words and theories.

"Upshot" truth (summary and substratum.)

On the Logic of Patterns.

1. Cousinhoods of generalities
2. The relation of an instance to its precise generalities.

"True Schematizing"

Limits of logic

Linguistic model & its generalization

"Substructure" as the proper demand, not logic; but not always.

S-0,52

what changes take place in categories & gradients with new learning, counterlearning, cognition? Interesting problem; I know nothing about it.

Section II.

~~The~~

"Families of patterns" in human affairs.

0. IN THE STIMULUS-FIELD ITSELF. Even the SGG is not certainly a gradient. How are stimuli segregated,

1. In language and thought.

The "language" and "conceptual thinking" parts of this section seem to me a lot of twisty intellectual exercises. Hell with them. NO. The "stimulus-field" stuff above leads into "conceptual thinking;" which in turn leads into thought. Maybe language fits in there, maybe it doesn't.

A. History of thought; and change in ways of thinking.

HISTOR YOF THOUGHT:

Categories change contents; category-identities change; ~~etc.~~

A GUY CHANGES HIS MIND: the ideas may be substantially the same; but the way they relate in his head-- which encompass which, may have changed. (RANK-ORDER changes I don't discuss, since this involves scaling, which worries me.)

B. In values: CONFIGURATIVE VALUES; AND CONFIGURATION OF ENTIRE SYSTEM.

1. Configurative values: configurations like independence, devotion to duty, originality, wherever they might appear.

2. "Scaling"-- successively small boundaries between categories sort of produce a GRADATION.

3. Configuration of entire system: simplest example "good and bad," others like "smartness vs. tax evasion" categories which probably exist in everybody's head, if they think about it; but the things they contain will vary from person to person. It is possible that certain configurations of interest will from person to person have no instances in common, yet be reasonably called "the same" configuration because of a position in a system.

Again

4. IT IS HIGHLY TEMPTING to seek generalized categories of "value," since shorter things-- let me call them "Thanksgiving Turkey values" (i.e., valuing Thanksgiving turkeys) lack generality, permanence etc. Hence it is an immediate temptation to set up more general categories like "tradition-oriented," etc. But these may ignore configurations of the general whole: i.e., two warring groups in a society may both think themselves "tradition-oriented."

So it busts!

S-0,53

~~2~~ 3

Section Two. "On categories & Judgement of Actions."

The use of categories & concepts by humans: re things and re people.

Law
Rules
Values (directional; configurational)
Principles
Educing

General legal cat's: Free Will...

On recognizing action as falling into categories.

Concepts and the Whorfian hypothesis.

Schematizing: how it occurs
- ¶ re Things
- ¶ re people
- ¶ re people aware of categories

S-0,54



I, 1

Poverty of Logic.

Properties of Descrips.

Families of Descrips Gl. formulas 'bunches,' theories

THEORY & SUBSTRUX. Nice to have.

Inappropriate demands on prelim. Des.

Purposelessness of premature refut.

Appropriate: bring home some bacon.

Semicircular; & unwinding.

Many ways of phrsg. same theory.

'That which' or 'whatever' theories → RZNBL.



S-0,55

I 4

(part of 'Improvement Model')

DO THINGS HAVE DEFINITIONS?



But scientific things?

⇒ Intuitively should be clear that more & more-stable things will be fixed on as the focus of sci. interest, and other things discussed in terms of them. So look very like defs.



S-0, 256

I 99

Kinds of descriptions that may annoy:

INVERSIONS

RECIPROCALS

AMODAL TYPES

NULLS

SCALES

PROJECTIONS.

RARELY ARE TWO THEORIES TRANSLATABLE INTO EACH OTHER.

One may say more, one less; they may overlap; one may collapse part of the other; they may disagree.

CAN'T MAKE OUT DISAGREEMENTS
⇒ SEMICIRCULAR.

I 9ff

S-0,57



II ORG.

STIMULUS & ACCESSION

THINKING interfitting of patterns?

LEARNED FIELD. DIFFERENCES BETW. INDIVIDLS. etc.

~~[illegible]~~

CATEGORIZATIONS (Psychology) ~~(Roger Brown)~~ → "INSOFAR AS WE ~~THINK~~ ACT ALIKE, THERE IS PR. FACIE EVIDENCE THAT PARTS OF OUR CONCEPTUAL FIELDS ARE ALIKE.")

SATISFAX. & AETH. APPREC. INSOFAR AS INVOLVING DEV'S from type.

DEVIATION FROM TYPE.

Recognish. Categories

Law Rules

Hierarchies, etc.

VALUES. → scales seek to find common dimensions, but interrelate individuals of considerable interest... CONFIGURATIVE





II

SUBSECTION ON SCALING.

→ It is these consistencies of reaction which permit us to write scales.

→ Overriding descriptions may be made of reaction-patterns, on which individuals can be measured.

~~→ BUT it is to be recalled how these sc~~

These scales duck individual peculiarities, and seek out common features and relationships inherent in the material — e.g. answers to quex (but surely, we hope, more



S-0,59

If scaling -2
~~than~~ that.

than that.)

→ But many circumstances w/o the scale will fall apart (e.g., tradition-orientation.)

⇒ It behooves us, when we use an approximation, to know as precisely as possible the assumptions which permit this approximation. Statistics is an example. (So is marking-on-a-curve; but this is confounded with prob. of fairness.)

⇒ Then we can [philosophically, to the detriment perhaps of soc. scientists] sketch the cstances in which model would cease to hold, or sort of fall apart.

→ It is in the DETAILS OF CONSTRUCTION that we understand the model.

⇒ This understanding (for which there is no substitute) tells us what we can predicate

on the model, and what we may conclude that it means. (So as a 'schematic,' Nelson, it isn't so prettily decidable after all...

Answer: the understanding of a scale or model that comes with precise knowledge of its construction and relationships is ohboy the best kind in the long run.

~~BUT insofar as we want to translate the secret things & details we cognoscenti know (though) must be put into the common-language translation as crude reservations.~~

→ The bit is that the overt result of the scaling procedure —such-and-such a dimension, etc.— may be the tangible 'front' of the theory which is presented to the world but actually certain presumptions — those which permitted the use of the scaling methods in the first place — are just as much a part of it. Thus to translate the theory satisfactorily to ord. lg., the assumptions must be written out longhand. FOR IT IS THERE THAT ARE

S-0,61

II - scaling - 4

WRONG OR RIGHT; AND ON WHICH THE TRUENESS
OF IT ALL HINGES.

S-0,62

III [ORGANIZATION.]

¶ DIFFICULTY OF PREFERENCE-SCALING.

Given ec. theory & the money standard, all is translatable.

BUT given larger considerations — like 'money, health & leisure' — how choose? 'Welfare function' here

Funny general case of this: where the alternatives don't have a yardstick*, ~~of principle~~; each alternative sticks out in another direction, like a sore thumb.

*money, or principles.

¶ HYDROGEN WAR ALTERNATIVES

→ IMPOSSIBLE problem. Must have principles to weigh alternatives; all the principles fall down at the extremity of the calculations.

→ You guess, and pretend to be systematic. I.e., 'national survival' as most tangible goal; surrender as out of Q. A. domestic-politically (couldn't publicly talk about it openly,) B. international-politically — should we counsel it, we are impossibly situated.

¶ CONFOUNDING FACTORS, EVEN IF WE COULD WORK PAYOFF.

→ Simplicity & tenability of credo.

→ Corrosive effect of 'consideration.'

¶ PHILOSOPHIES OF LIFE.

S-0,63

III Strategy-valuation.

MMM

MINMAX, MAXMIN & FLEXMIX.

The former suppose a constancy of function, gains to losses.

"Actually, I think it is fairly obvious that our payoff strategies, when they may reasonably self to exist (explicitly*) at all are in dynamic equilibrium..."

* Everychipmunks
Everyone has to have payoff strategies. But

S-O, 64

154

Section ~~Twxx~~ Three. "On Administering and Deciding."

Operations Analysis and the selection of rules and principles, values, configurations to value.

The problem of boundary-setting in the light of others' knowledge & likely behavior.

Commitment.

Attitude and emotion (commitment thereto.)

CONSIDERATION: the un-firmness of criteria (for measuring payoff;) the incommensurabilities of the various places you will get left by the various alternatives.

The difficulty of selecting payoff strategy.

PHILOSOPHIES OF LIFE.

Complications to a calculus {of goodness / on man.

- ¶ Will & volition
- ¶ Op. Analysis
- ¶ Lack of stable & permanent meaningful criteria

Strategies of commitment.

S-O, 65

HOLD

For final public super-version: catchy section-titles: begin with different prepositions: "On the logic of patterns," "In defense of Truth," "Among,...", "Under...", ...

{ Private Preface or "Confession" — scratched.
INSTEAD:
Academic Preface
Preface to the General Reader.

⇨ PHILOSOPHIES OF LIFE.

Titles:

Truth and Man.
Theory, Truth and Society.

"An analytic philosophy of sociology and of human decision."

Sections:
Theorizing
Recognizing
Calculating

S-0,66

FOUR THOUGHTS ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIOLOGY AND CHOICE:

an outline.

I. Theories and such

Section 1. The logic, or extralogic, of descriptions.

A. All the kinds of similarities

a. Categories, instances, relations

b. Inversions, projections, rephrasings

B. The many categories-- the 'that-which'es.

C. Theoretical option.

D. General formulations. (The formulation covering family.)

E. Substructure. a(The several-sided formulation tying in with other things.

b. As guiding and restricting.

F. Are there analytically true statements? (About things.)

Section 2. Procedure in a developing study.

A. The Axiological Approach.

Its incorrectness:

a. Just missing the mark. Go back to word One.

b. Asking too much at once: hasn't worked yet

c. Criterial problems.

1. Criteria must also be validated, their problems & insufficiencies mapped. (Compare Magnetic North.) This AT THE SAME TIME.

2. We want to get past the "it depends on the definition" stuff to the general formulation which does not depend on a definition because it subsumes each definition as a particular case.

Again, "just missing the mark" criterially upsets the system. Why should it?

B. The "Configurational" Approach,

a. The kinds of things to be done:

a. Precisifications;

b. Pattern validation;

c. General formulations; Seeing where it applies.

usually a little of each.

b. The method.

1. Unwinding a theory. Hull... M&M; Merton.

2. Factoring a theory. Things it could mean.
   -- Weber (Prot. Ethic)
   -- Marx.

3. Doing both.

4. IMPROVING A HUNCH.

What conceptual connections seem most promising?

Loss of information, etc.? Probably not.

S-0,67

The Axiological Approach

→ it's incorrectness

* The alternative approach
  precisifications, pattern validation & gentzen.
* Truth
* Unwinding a Theory
* Factoring a Theory
* Truth, Reality & Natural Language.

→ there are many things a natural-language theory can mean, and they cannot necessarily even be listed! But you can (when investigating a statement) try to list them, and you can (when advancing a statement) be as clear about it as possible.

S-0,68

I.

Not yet mentioned.

TENACITY. → When to be?

A. When considering the worst-case of a model which can well be described this way.

B. Quite dft. from improving an insight you think is good — you express sureness that this one instance is a case of what you're trying to describe, hence ~~most~~ at least one analytic property.

WHEN TO ~~CUT LOG. CONTEXT.~~ MAKE SOMETHING DEFINING?

A. You ~~lose~~ may lose something somewhere —

e.g. make something redundant or contradictory that you don't think is.

MOST GL. FORMULATION.

2-0, 68

S-O, 69

I 2

SUBSTRUX. 'What' vs. 'Why.' [~~Cau~~ dft. from ~~ext~~-dep. 'cause'.] — descrips. of gtst. generality vs. subdescrips.

As a theory improves you can say better when (universes, times...) it can be expected to hold. Tie-in w. substrux. grows. Explicitness grows: much easier to say now what theory is about; what disproofs would mean. Can now relate it better to ordinary lg.

Relation to ordinary lg.

Senses etc. 'Unpacking.'



Can it be disproven? A) Only ~~after awk~~ when it's good & ready B) Yes, if we think the evidence is all in (God)

C) Often ~~not~~ can't disprove ord.-lg. theory because it's true in some important sense DESPITE DIFFERENT PREFERABLE PRECISE Socsci phrasing.

SECTN. 2 | S-0,70



Upshot properties of this whole tours not yet discussed.

1. → 2. → 3. SPECIAL CASE
Very precise summary...

¶ SUMMARIES DIFFICULT.

I. Of theories, without content

II. Of things —

III. Of cost or gain, on a farfetched scale

¶ substructure

I.

II (Law.) higher-order analytics.

¶ FAMILIES OF PATTERNS

I. Theories may take all kinds of forms

II. Configurational similarities may be of many kinds

¶ Laws may take all kinds of forms

III. Many slightly-diff. schemes may be considered.

S-0,71

~~Unwinding a theory.~~

~~THEORETICAL OPTION:~~

~~What concenceptual connections seem most promising?~~



⋮

Is there a difference between theory & conceptual scheme?

~~Not~~ On the axiological view, certainly.

Not on mine. The statement, There is X (denominated a "category" on the Axl. view) is theoretical —— ~~yes, a~~ ~~but~~ yes, like a party game with the adjectives left out, a lot is left to be →

ascertained; ~~But~~ and like a Judgement Day where we all meet noted, little distinguished ~~to from~~ in appearance the strong theoretical statement (there are seven species of [illegible]) from the weak theoretical statement (there are 5 classes.)



dft kinds of
rather than dt

S-0,72

S-0,73

II

CONFIGURATIONS

e.g. - personality

- government

- values

- law & legal categories

Scales & patterns...

S-0,74

The curious position of ordinary language.

A. 'Terribly inaccurate' for sci. purposes

B. But proto-theoretical.
Scriv. on 'force' in physics.

C. Not to ~~be tampered~~ with except for cause.
1. To try to change or restrict a meaning is unfair to Ig.: you may be wrong

2.

D. Of course 'definitions' are arbitrary. ——→ f

that means 'you may select from among many senses and suggestions of a word, ~~#s~~ certain ones...' — but you can't carry a word anywhere you want without very thorough validation.

*. If you want to make it mean something very special, it's a disservice to everybody, should precatch

B. Chances are that it means configuration across a field of attributes... just as analysis would have shown ... here precisification of proto-theory may be more useful than research...

S-0,75

III

MEASURING THE COST OR GAIN

⇨ expected value & other parameters

on various scales

→ Can sometimes be projected on a single scale (money)

⇨ MEASURING COST OR GAIN

of A STRATEGY (scheme)

→ Similar to a 'pattern': categories instances, relations

→ You may consider other resembl ant schemes

S-0,76



AMORTIZATION & COST-AVERAGING SCHEMES.

III

S-0,77

I - 1

ON THE LOGIC OF PATTERNS.

[illegible]

1. BEFORE logic: we look for the principles. Logic only swings into action after we've stated the things we're going to work from.

2. Some characteristics of principles, descriptions, etc. Categories; relations; instances. Many derivational complications:

Theory-language and ordinary language.
2. Is the new technical sense the real meaning?
1. Running away with words.
3. Fucking up the word for everybody. Alternatives: use of "marked" word (satisfice) and more attention to the theory, and its equivalents in less precise language-- its cousins.
4. Ordinary usage leads to hints about how world is. But this is qualified of course.

Category-boundaries.
Inversions; derived categories; restatements/ Use of symbols is misleading because then you want to know dfs. right away.
FAMILIES OF DESCRIPTIONS. Often we want to know

LOGICAL PROPERTIES of any of them: What it means to "define."
Extensional (Instances.) In terms of a relationship or other categories. All completely proper.

UNWINDING A HUNCH or a theory. (Like "unpacking a statement.") Has to be done carefully-- trying to make sure you preserve the original.

Best example of a theory unwound-- "Is Law of Ef. Circ.?"

S-0,78

Many kinds of similarities possible among patterns: contents of categories, configuration of relations, etc.

Many cstances u/w the comparison of similar patterns is important.

When are two patterns "the same"? Answer is strictly context-dependent. In scientific disciplines, and many others, there are rather strict rules by which patterns are decided to be the same.

IMPLICATIONS OF DESCRIPTIONS. Stable features that you believe a pattern to have. Can be: boundary (semantic, though fixed by an extensional or ostensive method;) relationship, etc.

SOME things are implied by a pattern at nobody's behest: complements, relations (i;e., "The relation between X and Y" -) but there is no reason to suppose these automatically of interest.

Then there are the relations which the theorist supposes to be stable ones which will apply all the time: parts of the generalized pattern, which he supposes to apply always.

Theories using ordinary language:
INTERESTING SENSE of a theory.
By senses: true, false, messy.

Can have the same thing regarding theories not using ordinary language: applying it to a new field: a number of senses in which it can be taken, senses in which it may be used.
Here it is also true, false, messy; but if you are that unsure of how to apply it, and which theoretical constructs apply where, it probably isn't a theory at all, but rather just a vague sort of description.

THE whole notion of "disproof" is INAPPROPRIATE unless there is considerable precision in the theory.

The source of this precision may be of a deductive sort. I.e., there may be theoretical-type reasons for expecting exactly what we expect, in which case we know exactly what disconfirmation will disconfirm-- the premises, or application of them, which led to this expectation.

S-0,79

SECTION THREE.

In search of an Utilitarian calculus.
0. Everybody knows we can predict perfectly... (RESOLVING POWER
1. MEASURING and COSTS. % EXTENT TO WHICH ANALYSIS IS
Consideration 'ECONOMIC ')
Inventory of Alternatives.

GREAT PARADOX-EXAMPLE: calculating losses in an atomic war: how ~~xxi~~ select a rule for calculating payoff without calculating payoffs, which is impossible without a rule?

ON THE PROBLEM OF CALCULATING AT ALL. Attitude and personal commitment.

Here is the generalized form of "the linguistic model":

CONFIGURATIONS WHICH PERSIST over space, time, the vocal cavity, behavior, etc.

Here is the appropriate g.f.z/n of criteria = ⇨ Anything which is appropriate to test the presence of such a cfg. & has an accuracy which will stand up against reasonable arguments.

ALSO = sequential, disjunctive, coordinate.



S-0,80

S-0,81

THE PURPLE PAMPHLET.

In which

I preamble on kinds of language and description, and some of the fair shifting that may take place in trying to say things precisely, i.e., preening them for the process of logic;(anhymeneal)

I try to spell out the complicated relation between the language of social science and that of softer discourse-- replying particularly to those who would fit it into an axiomatic mold in its next decades;

I lightly treat of some very slippery things in the world, and how talking about them requires the descriptive flex I have recommended;

I talk about the use of principles in moral and normative discourse, and shortcut the questions of justification.

Rather, I say it is well to sketch out results; and note that however they fall there is something unsatisfactory: and I hypothesize that the only way out is to appeal to important, undemonstrated,commonplace truths about belief, hope, and caring.

S-0,82

Certain statements hang there out in space.. meaningless, unclear, impreeise... Are they good, useful, true?

DESCRIPTIONS do not really follow this model. There are two different kinds of description, which I could call 'loose' and 'precise,' but both of these are poor names. Their defining attributies are: kind A has a truth-mode, "not asserted," type B has the truth-mode "indeterminate." ?? There is a third mixed type, to be discussed... where trunk assertions count, but certain further ones do not, i.e. their implications cannot be charted.

I hope to show this to be the kind of languagex of a developing social science.

Each of these kinds of language can carry true and meaningful statements. I believe that remarks such as "there is no truth" and "a statement never means the same thing to any two people" stem from a misunderstanding of what is being said logically when people talk, study, discover, conjecture.

The reader may perceive a double intonation: I am talking to technial people, logicians, &c., and people who want to know what they are saying at the cocktail party.

In each of thesex three kinds of language you can make a thing true and may have good reason for so doing. Purpose: to getx something said better and more clearly.
Language of the settled formulation lacks this flex. No it doesn't. But it may crack when you bend it. Fuck.

Here we are. As part of a language gets really aachored, it may be progressively difficult to "make" a statement true... and more and more an empirical matter...

THE GREAT DIFFICULTY of principles from instances-- though often you're clear on the principles. Or the principles for certain instances, though you may not be sure how further instances fit in.

move

LOGICIANS have advanced the notion of the "Granpappy-formulation", such as to contain in some form all the possible things that can be said about a subject (let's call these "daughter-formulations," or statements.

I reserve term "formulation" as standing for that from which there may ensue deduction, while a statement may be puny enough to imply only itself, or almost nothing more.)
SUBSIDIARY QUESTION re patriarchal formulation: since it is

S-O, ~~84~~ 83

"that which covers all the questions we could ask of it," we may want to know about its natural boundaries-- like those, e.g., of classical physics.

BUT the great difficulty of relating statements put before us to some granpappy-formulation. So we can see how to treat them? What things would show them false? etc.

AND OFTEN we are presented with sets of statements which look alike but are really indeterminate. DO Freud and Aquinas say the same thing about human passions? Surely there's an important statement factorable in there somewhere that's common to both.

IN FACT, many times and places there are statements with a great but imprecise likeness. We often want to say, "But you're saying the same thing," to different people.

This is perhaps the first clue to meaning:
STUDY HOW STATEMENTS ARE USED.
Not same as study of how words are used ordinarily-- for sometimes it is the extraordinary sentences that interest us.
The words may be used curiously or vaguely: as with "semantics," where someone insists two people are using different terms for the same thing; or "Define your terms," where someone is sure the conversation will come much clearer when peole try to be very precise and specific.

'SENSES' and 'PATTERN-APPLICATION' are two different things. One deals with criteria, the other with buttoning-down ('izzing.')

One more gambit to be mentioned: "oh, sure, if that's what you mean by..." But that too buggers the question.

Truth may in part be a matter of using words aright. ~~Now, one of the critical points is that~~
We want to do two things: lay flat the statements, as it were, so as to eventually get a good look at them in a bright light; but still give the speaker a chance. And I would like to suggest that we should let him wiggle... otherwise straw men, etc. Hence discuss flexibility of words & all.
A) To show him really false we must hear his best case, INTERESTING SENSES.
B) To seek the truth, we must be able & backtrack, change s/x., seek to phrase it all better.

S-O, ~~85~~ 84

A P IA. Discursive language.
ORDINARY LANGUAGE (discussive purposes.)

People tend to be frustrated with ordinary language, sometimes, because when someone makes a statement it may get up and fly away.

The conversational gambit is then to ask for a preciser formulation: by a definition, general statement, or what-have-you. And even someone who has a fair idea what he means may goof up and be unable to defend his formulation, or the things that follow from it, because he has no ready formulation. Frustrating to player B.

Discursive language has this difficulty for both sides: nothing is precisely predicated, nothing surely follows, although many things seem to. Many buttonholes. NO NEC & SUFF. 'OPPOSITES'

Do not be misled: I am merely distinguishing between formulational language, in which the speaker claims that logical relations hold, and pre-formultional.

~~THE SKY IS B~~
~~No NEC & SUFF.~~

ANALOGY. Something in common. But is this enough for marriage? Is there a general statement you would care to make?

But even, it will be seen, in the later formulational stages, you may want to revert and change context, i.e., formulation under which you use the term.

(TRUTH THEREIN)..
Sure, true statements. But because of their loose quality, they can be piffled from all sides by someone who disagrees.

So we are led as if inevitably to FORMULATIONAL LANGUAGE.

"THE SKY IS BLUE"-- surely true;no formulation accessible to person outside physics; silly to say it's not blue, since you're just running away with what the assertion ordinarily means into an irrelevant context. Black or grey skies don't disclaim because man who says "As sure as the sky is blue" only means by-and-large. These new contexts need have no further justification than 'this fits ordinary usage' — unless A) challenged, making (perhaps) mandatory, a new formulation...

Criteria-demanding: HUNGRY
TRUE
GOOD
FAIR

TRUTH: Sure, I guess I agree, but in what way? Because depending on the gen. form., I might disagree or agree.

S-0,~~82~~ 85

A-P IB. PRECISE ~~KXMXXXXXKX~~ FORMULATIONS.

Procedurals in sociology and literal discourse.

S-O, 86

A P O.

To show the inutility of logic and to answer the people who criticize it; these are for me the samex objective, for I really want to plot thex difficulties of it, that's all.

~~SET THEORY~~

SET THEORY AND SYMBOLIC LOGIC embody principle we call 'logic', i.e., are capable of making statements with a fineness of structure-- a pregnancy for deduction-- such as to make ordinary languagex look sick. Categories, instances, relations ... but it doesn't tell you when logical inference is really appropriate; to look at the fullblown formulation begs the question, for to set it down in such a structurally precise fashion x may have skipped some difficulties.

[MEANING, TRUTH, PROPRIETY, VERIFIABILITY. All relevant to this.
METAPHYSICALITY

DESCRIPTIONS do not really follow this model.

When you are confrontedx with a description you don't know about-- you ought to know better just what's being said.
("Ask for definition" one method.)
We are used to come to understand things by digging the first principle or example of a concept. Perhaps that makes us unwary when hearing indeterminate statements, such that if we can think of a reasonable sense we may accept them.

S-0,87

THREE MODELS OF INTEREST IN THE PHILOSOPHY-OF-SCIENCE OF SOCIOLOGY.

SUMMARY. Writers who hope that Sociology shall become more "scientific" propose an axiomatic approach for greater rigor. It is hoped that with clearly articulated definitions, postulates, et cetera, procedure -- particularly the disproof of a false theory-- will be clearer, more definite and more scienfific.

We examine a model which has been very successful in the social sciences

We examine "the linguistic model," whose success has been eminent, and find that it succeeded because of the natural organization of the material, rather than the apparent axiomatic approach of its ~~founders~~ discoverers.

We now propose an alternative to the axiomatic model, called here"the improvement model:" gradually sharpened insights, slowly precisified categories, and apparent circularities unwound only slowly.

S-0,88

2

The axiomatic model has come of interest to many Sociologists as the right and proper way of going about things. Everyone since Comte in and out of the field agrees that in some way/Sociology should be "scientific," and the question or another has been repeatedly asked what the scientific method is.

The "axiomatic method," as expounded popularly in Cohen & Nagel's Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method, exemplified in Hauser & Duncan's Population, and expounded systematically in Zetterberg's On Theory and Verification in Sociology, is roughly as follows. Definitions and axioms should be set down with inordinate care, and theorems and corollaries deduced from them; only then is it properly a theory, ready for empirical testing.

/ Emphasis of apparent structure
/ by deduction is what leads to
/ global claims for a) disproof of
/ a whole thing by a fragment, b)
/ numerical probability of a theory
/ as transferring from a branch.

We have to look first at the power and strength of such an approach. First, you know just what you are talking about. Secondly, it looks like the way to really get somewhere-- theories can be disproven, their proponents cannot play Cheshire-cat and modify them left and right. (Wm. James quote about Wundt.) Circularities

S-0,89

of expression are clear from the structure of logic etc. so the stuff cannot be patched up by equivocation.

However,

The philosophic underpinnings of all this have been associated with the Vienna Circle etc.-- and, in recent times have come under attack, as by Scriv and Toulmin (Phil. of Sci., Uses of Argument.) In the present context, however, I will try to show the incorrectness of the axiomatic model of procedure by explicating an interesting success in the social sciences-- structural linguistics.

All languages may be analyzed into least units of sound, "phonemes," and least units of meaning, morphemes, which are made up of phonemes. Any language-utterance, then, consists of a series of morphemes, and each morpheme is a series of phonemes. Hence it is "segmental," may be analyzed as segments on a line. After every phoneme comes another phoneme.

These minimal components, however, do not always sound alike; but within any given language two different sounds that may be substituted for each other are"allophones," variants of the same phoneme, and two meaningful units may be considered as variants of"the same" morpheme--"allomorphs"-under specifiable conditions. "Swim" and "swam" are allomorphs. Grammar, then, is the study of what changes take place in an utterance under certain conditions.

I have described the following properties of the linguistic model: 1. It is categorical (each noise is either a certain phoneme, or another phoneme,

S-O, 90

or a series of phonemes, or it is not "linguistic" at all.)

2. It is segmental. ~~An interesting~~ A continuum is divided into sections, and this division yields knowledge and understanding.

However a. Segmental bounds undefined --not 'indeterminate;' rather, a number of boundaries are equally appropriate. This is just like deciding which ~~xxxxx~~ way to draw axes-- reasonable variants of a description.

b. COINCIDENCE that phonemes segmentality & morpheme-segmentality always coincide.

c. Anybody who tried to define phonemes in terms of boundaries would get screwed.

d. (Mention Bloomfield's prediction.)

3. It is trans-differential, ~~xx~~ identifying things as similar despite certain differences.

4. It is co-ordinate: ~~fixxx~~ certain conditions, determine certain things.

Not yet mentioned: trans-differential character of phonemes re history, dialect, speech impediments.

S-0,91

I have seen xx two interesting attempts to extend & generalize this... Adler & Birdwhistell...

> Superficial appearance of axiomatic success. Vide Bloomfield article in the first issue of Language.

But these won't work because of the subjecttmatter. (Give counterexamples to both assertions; then name things that xxx do fit the model.)

There is a larger sense in which the "linguistic model" may be construed, however, xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Suppose the subject matter had not been so formed, draped? Is Adler (minimality & clear definition) or Birdwhistell (segmentality) correct?

PROPER generalization: find what you can.

"The properties of the linguistic model from out to be the properties of the linguistic material.

The third model I will discuss is my own, the "improvement" model; and I consider it to be the correct method for inves tigation in the social-science enterprise. Xx To formulate it first as a criticism: If the xxxxxxxx theory which has been proposed inxx the axiomatic way is shown to be in some way false, or in some wise disconfirmed, it is torn up and thrown away. This would be all right, xxxx but it xxx is a most wasteful procedure when the theory discarded is very like the true one. To state it positively: there are no minimal requirements for "a scientific theory;"

S-0,92

Ftnt. or end-note.
I have been ~~xxkxd~~ told, "but you are denying the validity of scientific method." Rather, I am disputing certain claims of what "scientific method" is in this context. But rather than "scientific method," I prefer the phrase "reasonable procedure for finding out."

~~and~~ a theorist may choose the terms he wishes to clarify~~x~~, if any;
and take any measures he sees fit to change or fortify the theory against contrary evidence.

Lest this seem to be merely a negation of the other method ("Dadaist," as has been suggested,) let me hasten to add that any theorist with a serious claim to the interest of informed people is going to ~~xx~~ have to be just as clear, precise and specific as he can, ~~with clear~~ preferably furnishing clear & justified exx.

The point is this: except in ~~xxxxxx~~ the completed scientific enterprise-- which will not be finished for some time-- it may often be impossible to tell at the outset just what things a theory applies to; it may be impossible to furnish other than ~~x~~ rough and temporary definitions~~x~~, and it may be difficult to say what things are in what categories; any attempts to hurry precision may~~x~~ be pernicious and stultifying.

~~It is well to exm~~

S-0,93

Let us take examples in my favor.

Freudian theory
"Family"
(typical small-group example)

"area" -- MOST IMPORTANT ATTRIBUTES define evench.

In the face of these examples, let us examine what the people who favor axiomatics want.

SUBSTRUCTURE, MICRO-THEORY.

(rank-size rule)

But very often microtheory is lacking! /Should we dismiss the findings?

Let me assert that the model of consequence-and-disproof -- the axiomatic one -- is only suitable when the theoretical subject matter presents disjunct/alternatives. I suggest that hearing about the Principle of Parity being disproved -- where the principle had consequences across the board -- does not help us find a definition of "family" -- or better yet, what kinds of families furnish significant categories.

I have now to deal with the last and strongest complaint of the axiomatic advocates. It is that the theorist who is not in some way controlled -- as by formally setting out his theory precisely -- is likely to equivocate and shuffle, changing the meaning of terms to make them fit the facts.

In the earlier stages of an inquiry it may not be clear which things are circular. "soporific," "ego"...

I propose as an alternative method the unwinding of a theory, beginning with a number of propositions of indeterminate status, and in the progress of research successively deciding

S-0,94

which shall be the definitions.
to 'PIGGY'

Footnote, someplace. I am using "definition" here in the colloquial sense of principal commitment!.. Whether these are definitions in the stronger reducible (etc.) sense is an argument for elsewhere.

Reason: non-selfcontradxiction. Just because all A's we have found are B's, making this relation defining (making B an attribute of A) is dangerous-- suppose we find xxxx something very much like A which is not B? It might well have so many other attributes we had associated with A that we would have good reason for wanting to move the theory over so the new fact can sit on it too. But behold-- we have involved xourselves in a self-contradiction.

(as in, "An A is defined as a B which is C")

Let me put this point more precisely: in areas of multiple predication-- where related things are seen to have a number of attributes in common-- it may be clear that we have a category but systematically very difficult to say what the outstanding ('definitional') predicates of the category are. The ca tegory-boundaries which are more interesting may be nearby, not quite what we thought they were.

Research can proceed-- but using "criteria," rather than definitions-- because we may know pretty well what the terms mean in the present context without having a definite final formulation for all times and places-- e.g., "status."

In a sense, then, I want to say that there are real categories-- but not in the usual ontological sense. The real categories are those areas of multiple predica-

S-0,95

8A

PIGGY

~~The~~ A result: too many different things
The same Theory could mean;
a sprawling disjunction of
alternate ~~theories~~ interpretations. This is true
but unfortunate. If we are willing
to consider ~~the~~ a great variety of
interpretations of a theory, then
we need have less fear of ~~the~~
~~A true version~~ a true theory being
~~misinterpreted~~ discarded through misinterpretation — or
a false theory being salvageable since
we have killed all its parts.

Which to decirculanize? ~~The ones~~
~~which eventually provide~~ The ones such as will
provide an adequate description and describe
all interesting forms of variation — rather than
make these inexpressible (too few cat's) or self-contradictory (too many)

S-0,96

where this does not mangle
tion-- either bounded, or unbounded-- either procedurally

And all this without mentioning nat. language.

or because of the difficulty of summary.

The axiote may have one further objection, that this method fails to choose among the proliferation of resemblant theories. I would agree. But rather than seek to choose among them at this time, we should rather attend to their possible synonymies under the disjunctions of interpretation.

Last point: the relation of the technical languages we have been building to natural language.

1. Nat. lg. easily falls into circularities also
2. Nat. lg. furnishes important hints-- distinctions and niceties which may be significant
3. Injunctions upon the technician.
   - A. Don't mess up the language. (Neologisms... usually)
   - B. Take heed of the distinctions; for on one or the other level, it's a safe bet they all have meaning.
   - C. Translatability. IS there a class struggle? Let us recall that there are three modes of truth here: Yes, No and Sort Of; that the answer to social-science queries in ord. lg. may always be "sort of"-- but what the hell, as long as you can state it in nat. lg., at all, conditionally, with explanations-- you've done pretty good.

S-0,97

BASICITY:
rather; conditionals
E.g.: 'unless modified'



TRANSFORMATIONS

What they do { Express differences, change
" resemblances
SAVE TRUTH

What they are { boundary - change
identification, dis-identification
cutting of relations, adding of relations
subsuming (by disjunction) (as in 'listing') (HUH?)
COLLAPSING — describing a tendency out of the glorious generality, for instance.

AREN'T FORMALIZABLE (?)

ARE formalizable. As a selection of st. within a formulation, which shall be preserved for the new formulation.

TODAY, THE SITUATION

A-P ⊙

Set - theory's fine.

PRINCIPLES FROM INSTANCES DIFFICULT.
EVEN THOUGH OFTEN YOU'RE CLEAR ON THE PRINCIPLE.

So is Granpappy - formulation

~~PATTERNS → DESCRIPTIONS~~ ⇨ What counts: 'senses' - in what →

SIMILAR STT. FACTORABLE EVERYWHERE.

2 additions to Boolean algebra: for precise & imprecise language: the options of each.

TRANSFORMATIONS aren't formal.
⇨ TRUTH-SAVING OR EXPRESSING CHANGE

A-P I. Procedurals in sociology & literal discourse

ATTRIBUTION-AREAS

PATTERNS ⇔ DESCRIPTIONS

ABILITY. TO EXPRESS THINGS.

A-P II. Certain shifty things in the world.

Comprehend same field, how pt generalities
New organization
like & unlike in new ways

Attitudes
Ideas
Organizations

Power
Law
Categories of response in life.

Threat-boundaries
Esthetics
Change of purposes
Change of interests of novel!

A-P III. Pricing - functions of decisions.
Extrapolation of extensional instances.

Single - & Multi-purpose indices. ~~XX~~ CAN'T SHIFT
Extensional ~~XX~~ ~~XX~~ principled goals -
NO CHOOSING.

PHILOSOPHIES OF LIFE.

S-0,98

THE GRANPAPPY FORMULATION. ('That ~~nato~~ which covers all the questions we could ask of it.' Subsidiary question: its natural boundaries. E.g. of classic physics.

~~Less big a~~ Daughter-formulations.

~~SIMILAR STATEMENTS FACTORABLE EVERYWHERE~~

'villainy' 'Oedipus' ← What counts: 'senses' — in what ways is & isn't it true? how (what sense) are you asserting it?

TRANSFORMATIONS AREN'T FORMALIZABLE (???)

Kinds: truth-saving
expressing change

A-P I Procedurals in sociology and literal discourse.

DESCRIPTNS

PATTERNS → ~~DESCRIPTIONS~~
~~heaviness & precision of attribution~~

TRUTH OF 'PATTERN' lies really in its ability to express & summarize — both the typical (taken loosely) and the unusual.



~~DESCRIPTIONS~~ THEORIES. Tightness, heaviness, precision of attribution.

Position of ordinary lg:

DON'T SHAKE. Real meaning, many legs.
ATTRIBUTION AREA stuff.
DON'T PIN. Category may travel.
To make unusual assertions, gotta use ord. lg.

18 MAY.

APO.

To show the inutility of logic and to answer the people who criticize it. These are for me the same ~~purpose~~ objective, for I really want to plot the difficulties of it, that's all.

SET THEORY AND SYMBOLIC LOGIC embody prin's we call 'logic,' express log. ~~principles~~ formulations with a fineness making ord. lg. look sick. Categories, instances, relations... but it doesn't tell you when logical inferences is really appropriate, which you might well want to know.

Certain stn hand out in space... meaningless, unclear, imprecise... Are they useful, good, true?

DESCRIPTIONS DO NOT REALLY FOLLOW THIS MODEL. There are two different kinds of description which I could call 'loose' & 'precise,' but both of these are poor names. Their defining attributes are: kind A has a truth-mode, "not asserted," type B has the truth-mode "indeterminate." There is a third mixed type, to be discussed... where trunk assertions count, but certain further ones do not. I take this to be the lg. of socsci.

Each of these kinds of language ~~has~~ can carry true and meaningful statements.

In each of these kinds of language you can make a thing true and may have good reason for so doing. Purpose: to get something said better and more clearly. [Language of the settled ~~theory~~ formulation lacks this flex. No it doesn't. But may crack when you bend it. Fuck.]

THE GREAT DIFFICULTY of principles from instances — though often you're clear on the principles.

S-O, ~~78~~ 99

A-P #. PRICING-FUNCTIONS OF DECISIONS.

Extrapolation of extensional instances: WON'T DO.

Single-&-Multi-purpose indices ✗ ⟷ can't get from one to another.

~~Extensional~~ ⟷ principled goals.
NO CHOOSING.

Always left to principles.
these are contingent on the world in their payoffs.
We still come out with similar sets of them, maybe.

ANALYSIS OF RATIONALITY.

IS THERE A CHOOSING?

I see this as the ultimate problem of moral philosophy; and a much harder one. For beyond the first appearances, it's quite hard to say...
→ EMPIRICAL GROUNDS (that's that'll never be established) that I really think lines can finally be drawn. SPIRITUAL HOLLOWNESS. ~~[illegible]~~ DETACHMENT OF INDIV. FROM INDEPENDENT MOVEMENT...
→ Very like what we have in the West; and the people who love our life & culture uncritically mis the ill we have, LEGITIMACY, REGIMENTATION. PERSONAL DETACHMENT, ESTRANGEMENT, PRIVATE AGONY: can choose any adversary... (not just the Party or State, against whose [illegible] helpless...)

IT IS IMPOSSIBLE NOT TO BE COMMITTED TO LIFE AS WE KNOW IT. BUT RIGHT? AKG. for SURELY BY ALL THE SENTIMENTS WHICH ALLOW COMMITMENT... (PRAG. SOCIOL. & MORALISM)

IA - ord-lg. (OPPOSITES)
IB - precise-lg - (OPPOSITES (theol.))
IC - indeterminate

AP I

CANDIDATE-STATEMENT — you can't tell what language it's in, let alone whether it's true though you knew it to be true in a sense, though you can find examples... (Thomas' Four Wishes)

BEST THING MAY BE TO MAKE IT TRUE, then whittle & precisify.

AP II.

Certain Stuffy things in the world.
- ¶ New generalities comprehending a previous domain
- ¶ New organization, which changes emphases
- ¶ Likeness & unlikeness along unexpected directions

ATTITUDES
IDEAS
ORGANIZATIONS
POWER
LAW (dft. laws; dft. interpretation of old law)
CATEGORIES OF RESPONSE IN LIFE
THREAT-BOUNDARIES
AESTHETICS
CHANGE OF PURPOSES
CHANGE OF INTERPRETATION of e.g. novel.
VIEWS & SCHOOLS

cluster-concepts

S-O, 100

N

A-P III.

POLICIES & STRATEGIES. POLITICAL PLURALISM.
PHILOSOPHIES OF LIFE — EMOTIONAL COMMITMENT.
ANALYSIS OF RATIONALITY. HIERARCHY OF VALUE GOES IN AP II?
UTILITARIAN CALCULUS.

~~BN~~

The problem is: what pricing-function-- what principles for common action, jurisdiction, dispute-settling-- shall be adopted?

Moral systems have not particularly attempted to deal with cases in general, only cases as examples.

Invariably there are different outcomes-- like kinds of pleasure, or the distribution of pleasure, in the Benthamite system-- or human worth...

For all of these, stunning counterexamples can be constructed/mechanically.
almost
permit us to spread them out
Hence all these systems into a system of rules. But so many systems of rules are possible, and each would sleight several possible worlds in ways that do not comfortably square with the premises of their founders.

There is one exception that I know of, a moral system which has only one End, and hence no/pricing-function. That
obvious
is Communism, whose ultimate goal is world control by the people -- or its warders. But that, too, splits down to either "better life," in which case the one operating-rule, "work toward world revolution through any means," is just a very distilled pricing-function, by which a thing is good so far as it contributes to the final upheaval, for which any other
or takeover,
working toward a better life is just a poor substitute. (The other reason, perhaps more ideologically sophisticated, is the "inevitability" of socialist triumph,* which (results uncounted) is neither good nor bad.)

EXTENSIONAL pricing-function must also be justified.

Is it just that I'm asking for too-fine principles? (The fellows would, with half a chance, precisify down to the applicable?) I doubt it. For it just seems to be a fact about the philosophies that they don't cut it that deep.
Exception: Bentham. But for anyone who would argue that principles could be refined, how deal with the conflict-cases? By what principle, even given predictive certainty,

S-0,101

would a decision be made between equipleasurable-- or worse, very different kinds of equipleasurabiligenic things, like libraries and recreational centers? Or worse, given not predictive certainty but probabilities, how apportion payoffs to these different things? That it should be linear with likelihood seems unsatisfactory, for these are different kinds of things; gotta have some libraries and some recreation, but the value of each in the other's plethora is much inflated.

SHOULD SOMEONE APPEAR with a set of principles so finely-cut as I ask, I should back down and examine the justifications. That no one has, lately, I take as a sign that this is well-nigh impossible.

Could they be purely operating rules? I doubt there are any crisp enough, proposal strong enough to be generalizable would seem to req. moral character.

THE ANSWER. (& dispositions.)

A. We all have operating rules. And these have strikingly similar aspects (in certain circumstances lead to the same action, i.e., HAVE IMPORTANT DESCRIPTIVE RESEMBLANCES. /though /with varying /alacrity.

These rules and dispositions, when applied to common subject-matter, like giving-in to people with wants, or rescuing the endangered, or circumscribing personal wants for others' good, vary: in when we'll do them, and all. But as long as the world is constituted so that we manage, generally, Okay; this is a socio-pragmatic judgement, resting on the theory that as long as people follow more or less the things they were more or less brought up to do... or are supported in doing... things will not fall apart. Most of us have fair shake toward being happy.

We can personally justify altruism one way or the other, and insofar as general altruism brings general weal, we may find we are happier if we act somewhat on the altruistic side; which is nice. This, unfortunately, is not enough to restrain kind housewives from snitching at the supermarket, etc. We shd. motivate nice deeds, work out equitabilities.

NEITHER DOES THIS DEAL WITH FUNDAMENTAL MORAL JUSTIFIX. Fug.

Will gratify a lot of the people enough of the time so we can say, "this is about as good as it can get, considering the situation." So: complacency.

B. A big, big question still left. Communism. This is a moral problem of the first water, but for reasons most people don't see. Certainly not question of man or free enterprise; for the Communists claim to care about man, and it is conceivable that Western society could continue even pleasantly with more restrictions on, or total abolition of, big business. NOT EVEN GROUPINESS: for our pleasures shared...

But Communism seems to propound new kinds of satisfaction * in return for the work put into it: rather than derive pleasure

*Same with getting off the karma-wheel. But this rests on a theory which is false. Suicide cults resemble these; but answer: prob. more good to go on living...

S-O, 102

from a childs smile or the starshine or the love of a good woman, we are to be gratified insofar as our things are for the good of the state; and the state's course, because of the organizational setup, is well beyond our questioning. This is something new; and the vehemence of e.g. the Chinese Communists assures us that it is an enormous thing, not like the gratification we feel when we buy war bonds. Sentiments not conducive to the one great goal are to be wiped out. [Note I do not mention govt. of societies, the best govts. have from time to time done horrible things, with a kind of justification... give bft. of doubt, to examine these other things...

This is not false eduction, for these are the principles they have announced. Neither is it over-attention to a symbolic statement, for there is good evidence that they are successful. But in the light of the philosophical examination I am trying , we cannot call it horrible at once. We must rather test whether there is good reason for calling it horrible. To be sure, it violates the rules of decency we hold with regard to privacy, individual preference, choice of love... but let us regard this for a moment as a proposal, that we shall throw over these rules, and look nakedly at the ideas involved.

Let us suppose that the Communists can achieve all they say they can, toward making each man's creature-joys and strivings the dictates of the state. Let us suppose, in fact, that they can make everybody happy in this way -- untiringly, deeply happy; as we know that fanatical children can be made happy.

Knowing, in other words, that all the things we love, and the general reasons we have for loving, or judging, or caring, are to be swept aside, and new substituted.

Let us suppose, as a point two, what many commentators believe: that the final communist utopia is as unattainable as it is vague, and that what they call "socialism" is more or less its permanent condition-- masses of people cleverly organized through one central agency into submission.

We feel, of course, that this is wrong: but why is it wrong? new twist of commitment

Before we talk fast ...

SPIRITUAL HOLLOWNESS
DETACHMENT OF INDIVIDUAL FROM INDEPENDENT MOVEMT.

Very like what we have in the West; add the people who love our life and culture uncritically miss the ill we have. LEGITIMACY, REGIMENTATION. PERSONAL DETACHMENT, ESTRANGEMENT, PRIVATE AGONY; can choose any adversary...
(not just the Party or State, against whose indomitability helpless...)

If this problem is not clear, it is my inadequacy of stating to state it clearly.

My bet: 1) worse in the aggregate
2) no subtleties of caring such as to give us a rounded sense of anything
3) completer misery or the isolate person.